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Abstract
Sean McGuire
A BROAD SPECTRUM DEFENSE AGAINST ADVERSARIAL EXAMPLES
2021-2022
Robi Polikar, Ph.D.
Master of Science in Electrical & Computer Engineering
Machine learning models are increasingly employed in making critical decisions
across a wide array of applications. As our dependence on these models increases, it is
vital to recognize their vulnerability to malicious attacks from determined adversaries. In
response to these adversarial attacks, new defensive mechanisms have been developed to
ensure the security of machine learning models and the accuracy of the decisions they
make. However, many of these mechanisms are reactionary, designed to defend specific
models against a known specific attack or family of attacks. This reactionary approach
does not generalize to future – yet to be developed – attacks. In this work, we developed
Broad Spectrum Defense (BSD) as a defensive mechanism to secure any model against a
wide range of attacks. BSD is not reactionary, and unlike most other approaches, it does
not train its detectors using adversarial data, hence removing an inherent bias present in
other defenses that rely on having access to adversarial data. An extensive set of experiments showed that BSD outperforms existing detector-based methods such as MagNet and
Feature Squeezing. We believe BSD will inspire a new direction in adversarial machine
learning to create a robust defense capable of generalizing to existing and future attacks.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1

Motivation: Adversarial Machine Learning Defenses
Machine Learning models are now an indispensable tool used across a wide array

of fields from medicine to business to defense among many others. Adversarial machine
learning explores the process of attacking and defending these models. It is vital that we
recognize the inherent vulnerability of these models and develop strong defenses to secure
them against malicious attacks.

1.2

Adversarial Machine Learning
Adversarial machine learning (AML) refers to scenarios where an adversary, pre-

sumably with malicious intent, is present in the environment. The adversary seeks to manipulate the data to compromise the model. An AML framework typically includes two
actors: the adversary (the attacker) and the model creator (the defender). The attacker’s
goal may simply be to cause the model to generally perform poorly, or perhaps cause the
model to misclassify a specific set of instances. The defender, on the other hand, wants
to ensure that the model is secure and robust to attacks. The adversary may be aware of
a potential defender and attempt to craft an attack that then bypasses the defense. This
cat and mouse game continues perpetually. It is widely accepted that the attacker is at an
advantage as defenders often react to new attacks, but there has not been much work on
developing a proactive defense which can generalize to a wide spectrum of attacks.

1

1.3

Problem Statement
Machine learning models are susceptible to adversarial attacks, which can exploit

inherent vulnerabilities of a classifier. Due to these vulnerabilities, an adversary can easily
perturb a sample very slightly and force an incorrect classification of that sample. As
more machine learning models are implemented in critical tasks, it is vital that a defense is
constructed to secure these models.
While new defense mechanisms have been developed – and continue to be developed – many of these existing defenses are reactionary, and only work on a subset of attacks
or datasets for which they are specifically designed. Additionally, some defenses work by
learning to approximate attacks, but those defenses are typically trained on one type of attack. In such cases, it is unrealistic to assume that a defense designed to mitigate one type
of attack will generalize to different types of attacks. An effective defense must generalize
across a variety of attacks and datasets without being biased by any form of training on any
given attack.

1.4

Scope of Thesis
This thesis introduces the formulation of a broad spectrum defense (BSD) that is

capable of detecting adversarial samples. The primary focus of this work is on neural
networks, but BSD can be suitably modified to work with any classification model. This
work demonstrates the proposed defense’s ability to detect adversarial samples on a wide
variety of attack types and datasets, and further shows that it outperforms many of the
existing works. An analysis of the defense is performed under a gray box scenario that
assumes the attacker has access to a realistic amount of information about the model.
2

1.5

Research Contributions
A proactive defense strategy is proposed, developed and evaluated in this effort.

The proposed broad spectrum defense:

1. introduces a proactive approach providing considerable – often significant – improvement over many of the existing evasion attacks;
2. is capable of generalizing to future attacks;
3. scales to large models and datasets, compatible with networks of any size and can
analyze data with little delay;
4. has the ability to work in an online setting, as it does not require any retraining of the
existing classifier;
5. is data agnostic, that is, it can be used with image and non image data;
6. can be suitably modified to work with non-neural network type classifiers;
7. while primarily designed for evasion attacks, it has the potential to generalize to
poisoning attacks.

1.6

Organization of the Thesis
Chapter 2 provides an overview and background for neural networks and adversar-

ial machine learning, and also introduces the important terminology used throughout this
thesis. In Chapter 3, existing adversarial attack and defense approaches are discussed in
detail. Chapter 4 introduces the broad spectrum defense and discusses the modules used to

3

construct the defense including the Class Divergence Detector. Chapter 5 covers a discussion of the experiments performed, the results of these experiments, as well as comparisons
between BSD and existing approaches. Chapter 6 concludes this thesis and explores possible avenues for future work.

4

Chapter 2
Background
2.1

Adversarial Machine Learning
Adversarial machine learning includes the process of attacking and defending ma-

chine learning models. Machine learning models are inherently vulnerable to adversarial
attacks, an adversarial attack describes the process of generating a sample which is misclassified even though it is highly similar to samples that are classified correctly [15]. Defending against such attacks has proven to be a difficult challenge as every time a defense
is proposed, other attacks appear that thwart the defense. This cat and mouse game continues endlessly, but it appears that the attacker always has the upper hand. Before exploring
specific attacks and defenses one must understand the environment in which an attacker
operates, along with the attackers goals. This section will introduce a high level taxonomy
used to describe adversarial attacks and defenses.

2.1.1 Attack Taxonomy
The attack taxonomy is used to describe the nature of the attacks based on the
amount and nature of information available to the attacker. The first attack taxonomy was
formulated by Barreno et al., whose taxonomy introduced the now commonly used terminology such as causative (poisoning), explorative (evasion), targeted and indiscriminate
[1]. Barreno’s taxonomy primarily reflects the attacker’s intentions. The next taxonomy
was developed by Biggio et al., whose taxonomy then introduced the concepts of perfect
knowledge (white box), limited knowledge (gray box), and no-knowledge (black box) attacks [3]. Biggio’s taxonomy, on the other hand, reflects the amount of information that
5

is available to the attacker. Depending on such amount and nature of information available, the attacker can craft stronger or more strategic attacks. An agreed upon taxonomy is
helpful in describing the intended environment for an attack or defense.

2.1.2 Attack Taxonomy with Respect Attacker’s Available Information
2.1.2.a Black Box Attacks. Attacks designed based on the amount of information
available to the attacker starts by the assumption of little or no information being available
to the attacker, introducing the idea of a zero knowledge scenario, also known as the black
box attacks. In the black box setting, the attacker does not know anything about the model
architecture or its parameters. In most black box formulations, however, the attacker is
assumed to know, possibly, about the application domain, and may have access to the test
data. Given one or more samples from the test distribution, an attacker has an initial point
used to construct adversarial examples. Without this point, the problem becomes incredibly
difficult as the adversary would not have a ground truth that could be perturbed. Evaluating
defenses in a black box scenario reveals performance of the model when an attacker can
only probe the classifier by passing in test data points and receiving a classification. The
attacker can utilize this feedback to craft an attack point with more impact. The simplest
black box attacks can be done by perturbing the original test data to the point of misclassification. Two of these naı̈ve methods are additive uniform noise and Gaussian blur [11].
These two types of attacks perturb the sample by adding Gaussian or uniform noise to the
data. If the samples classification remains unchanged, the magnitude of noise is increased
until misclassification occurs. It is important to evaluate a defense on these naı̈ve methods
as a robust defense should prove effective against against a large variety of attacks.
6

2.1.2.b White Box Attacks. In the opposite scenario of white box attacks the attacker has complete access and knows everything there is to know about the model. That
level of information includes the model itself, its parameters, training and test data as well
as any defenses used along with their parameters. A white box attack is unrealistic, of
course, but it represents the worst case scenario from the model’s (and therefore the defender’s) perspective. Some examples of white box attacks include Fast Gradient Sign
Method (FGSM), Projected Gradient Decent (PGD), the Carlini Wagner attack, and many
other that will be introduced in the next chapter.

2.1.2.c Gray Box Attacks. A more realistic - and often used - attack type is the socalled gray box attacks. Gray box attacks describe any scenario along the spectrum between
complete knowledge (white box) and zero knowledge (black box) cases. Some of these
variations include when the attacker is aware of the model (or perhaps even the defense
applied), but not its parameters. In this case the attacker would attempt to construct the
model (or its defense) itself with some arbitrary parameters, attack the model and transfer
these adversarial samples onto the target classifier. Another example of gray box attack can
allow the attacker to access all parameters of the classification model, but not its defenses.
The attacker may then attempt to craft white box attacks against the classifier and attempt
to transfer them to the defended model. The gray box scenario often includes the use
of surrogate models. A surrogate model is a model selected by the attacker; the attacker
trains the surrogate and creates attack samples against it. Finally, the attacker transfers
these samples to the target model. Some examples of gray box attacks include the above
mentioned attacks such as FGSM, PGD, and the Carlini Wagner attack. In a gray box
7

scenario, these attacks would be performed against a surrogate model (a model thought to
approximate that used by the defender). In the gray box scenario described in this work,
the adversary has complete knowledge of the model, but the adversary has no knowledge
of the defense, so in this case the attacker launches a “white box” attack against the model,
but the attack is really “gray box” as the samples are operating on a defended model.

2.1.3 Attack Taxonomy with Respect to Attacker’s Goals
2.1.3.a Targeted Attacks. In a targeted attack, an adversary is interested in forcing a
misclassification to a specific class. For example a targeted attack may involve an adversary
seeking to have all stop signs classified as speed limit signs. In a targeted attack, the attacker
has a narrow goal of just impacting or classifying samples into a single “target” class. Any
of the above mentioned attacks can function as targeted attacks by slightly modifying the
attacks parameters.

2.1.3.b Untargeted (Indiscriminate) Attacks. An untargeted attack occurs when
the adversary seeks to force a misclassification to any class and does not care the class
into which the sample is misclassified. An untargeted attack is successful if the sample
is classified as any class besides the correct class. Untargeted attacks are able to generate
adversarial samples with smaller perturbations than their targeted counter parts. This can be
understood by considering a classification problem with 100 different classes. The targeted
adversary may need to perturb one image towards the classification boundary of a class
which resides on the opposite side of the decision surface. An untargeted attack can perturb
the image until it crosses any decision boundary which can result smaller distortions. Some
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of the above mentioned attacks are originally implemented in an untargeted form, so these
require no modification, while other attacks that are natively “targeted” can be made to be
“untargeted” by performing attacks against every class and selecting the sample with the
smallest perturbation.

2.1.3.c Poisoning Attacks. In a poisoning attack, the adversary has the ability to
insert a number of samples into the training set. The samples inserted into the training set
can be used to completely devastate the entire model, or they can be used to target a specific
region of the model. The first mention of learning with adversarial data in the training set
can be traced back to Kearns et al. in the 1998 paper titled Learning in the Presence of
Malicious Errors [18]. However the concept of a poisoning attack, or intentionally comprising a machine learning model at training time was first introduced in 2008 by Nelson
et al. [31]. A poisoning attack aims to manipulate the behavior of a given model typically
by introducing maliciously crafted data points into the training data. A poisoning attack
can have different goals: for example, one can seek to introduce the greatest amount of
error into the model by crafting attack samples which will cause the misclassification of
test samples, as was the case with the poisoning attack against the spam filter in Nelsons
work. One downside of the poisoning attack that seeks to compromise the classifier – from
the attacker’s perspective – is that the attack may be obvious. When the model is attacked,
the classification performance may be significantly degraded, which can then be easily detected.
A more modern approach to poisoning attacks is a targeted poisoning attack. In a targeted
poisoning attack, the adversary seeks to control a small region of the feature or label space
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by inserting malicious samples into the training set defining a specific region of that space.
After training, the model will return a high test performance overall, but unbeknownst to
the victim, the adversary has inserted a backdoor which can be exploited. The purpose of
the backdoor attack is to insert samples into the training set which have some (possibly
imperceptible) pattern. The model then learns to associate this pattern with a given class
as chosen by the attacker. After training is complete, the adversary can then insert any data
point with the backdoor and cause the intended and targeted misclassification. This process
was first demonstrated by Chen et al. in 2018 [7].
There exists many real life situations in which a backdoor attack can be effectively used.
One example is facial recognition: if the adversary has inserted backdoor samples with
pink sunglasses with the incorrect label as an authorized user, an unauthorized user can
then walk through security with pink sunglasses and bypass the facial recognition model.
A different example comes in the form of autonomous vehicles. Autonomous vehicles
often use deep learning models to detect and classify objects in their surroundings. If a
backdoor is added to the model which associates the presence of a sticker with a speed
limit sign, the sticker can be placed on “Stop” signs and the model will then recognize a
stop sign as a speed limit sign, with potentially deadly consequences. Physical backdoors
were explored by Eykholt et al. where they demonstrated that they can make backdoor patterns that mimic normal events in the real world such as stickers on the stop sign as shown
in Figure 1 [10].
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Figure 1
Example of a Backdoor Attack on Physical Object from [10]

2.1.3.d Evasion Attacks. The focus of this thesis is on developing defenses against
a broad spectrum of evasion attacks. Evasion attacks are therefore explained in more detail
below, with specific strategies and types of evasion attacks described in Chapter 3.
Unlike poisoning attacks, evasion attacks typically occur at test time. In an evasion
attack, the adversary seeks to perturb a sample, pass it to the model for evaluation with a
deliberate goal of having it misclassified. The first mention of an adversary at test time
in the machine learning domain comes from Dalvi et al. [8]. Dalvi mentions the presence of an adversary and a game that occurs between the adversary and the classifier, in
which the classifier attempts to protect itself against the attack (describing the presence of
the defender). This cat and mouse game describes the iterative nature of the creation of
adversarial attacks and the response of creating robust defenses. Dalvi explains in detail
how an adversary can craft samples that can be misclassified using dynamic programming.
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More recently, however, evasion attacks have been brought to center stage by Goodfellow
et al’s work in the – now widely cited – panda example, illustrated in Figure 2 [15]. The
figure demonstrates that the original image of a panda can be perturbed with some small
modification to pixel values, resulting in the classification of a gibbon.

Figure 2
Example of Evasion Attack taken from [15]

As mentioned above, one key difference between evasion and poisoning attacks is
the time of attack: test time for evasion attacks and training time for poisoning attacks. As a
result, poisoning attacks seek to corrupt a model while it is being trained, typically with the
goal of having an overall poorly performing classifier. Evasion attacks, on the other hand,
are crafted to misclassify specific test samples while performing well on other samples.
The adversarial sample is typically generated by applying some perturbation to the original
data. Ideally, the adversarial sample should look indistinguishable from the original data,
while being misclassified by the model. The goal of misclassification is achieved by applying carefully crafted perturbations to the sample, where the perturbation is designed such
that an appropriate distance metric – between the original and the perturbed instance – is
12

minimized, while the loss function of the model is maximized.
The strength of an evasion attack can be described using two metrics. The first
metric is the distance between the original and the perturbed sample, computed using the
LP norm as described in Equation 2.1.
n
X
1
0
0
||x − x ||P = (
|xi − xi |P ) P

(2.1)

i=1
0

In Equation 2.1, x and x are the original and perturbed instances, respectively, and n is the
0

dimensionality of x. A small value means that the perturbed sample (x ) is very similar to
the original (x), while a larger value describes a more heavily perturbed sample. The most
commonly used metrics are the L0 , L2 , L∞ norms. The L0 norm refers to the number of
non zero elements in the difference as shown in Equation 2.2, where we define 00 = 0.
When minimizing the L0 norm, the attack is attempting to modify the fewest number of
pixels to create as strong of an attack as possible.
0

||x − x ||0 =

X

0

|xi − xi |0

(2.2)

i

The L2 norm measures the Euclidean distance between x and x0 as shown in Equation 2.3. The L2 distance is not sensitive to the changes in individual pixels and instead
looks at average mean squared distance across the entire sample. An attack that uses L2
norm tends to apply smaller perturbations across many pixels.
v
u n
uX
0
|xi − x0 |2
||x − x ||2 = t

(2.3)

i=1

The L∞ norm measures the maximum distance between any two pixels ||x−x0 ||∞ =
max(|x1 − x01 |, ..., |xn − x0n |). The L∞ distance returns the maximum perturbation for a
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given pixel across the entire sample, for example, an image.
0

0

||x − x ||∞ = max(x − x )

(2.4)

Adversarial evasion attacks attempt to create a sample which is misclassified by
the model while looking almost identical to the original sample. To keep the adversarial
sample as close to the original as possible, many attacks use the LP norm to restrict the
perturbation. Evasion attacks differ in optimization problems, but most attacks minimize
the LP norm to restrict the amount of perturbation which can be applied. So although the
attack functions differ, the attacks work with the same underlying similarity metric, for this
reason it is vital to evaluate defenses against LP norm based attacks. Some newer evasion
attacks move away from utilizing the same similarity metric of an LP norm. These attacks
develop different similarity metric which lead to the development of structurally different
attack points. As the non-LP norm attacks often succeed in evading the classifier, these
samples must also be evaluated.
The second metric used to describe evasion attacks is the attack success rate. The attack
success rate is essentially the rate at which the adversarial attack achieves its goal. In
evasion attacks, the goal can be an untargeted attack, or a targeted attack. In an untargeted
attack, the attacker’s only objective is to force the sample simply to be misclassified as any
class other than the correct class. More specifically, let the set (X, Y ) contain pairs of data
and labels, where Y is the set of all classes. A sample has the label yo ∈ Y , here yo is
the original (true) label of the sample. In an untargeted attack, the adversary adds some
perturbation to the data x0 = x +  to achieve the goal yut ∈ Y ∧ yut 6= yo , where the
new label yut is any class other than the true label Yo . In a targeted attack, the attacker also
14

introduces a perturbation x0 = x + , but in this case the attacker seeks a misclassification
of yt selected by the attacker to be any specific label other than the original yo . In this work,
we develop BSD against untargeted attacks, as such attacks result in stronger adversarial
examples. It is important to note that in some attacks the “untargeted” version is the process
of performing a targeted attack against all classes and selecting the class that resulted in
misclassification with the lowest distance.

2.1.4 Autoencoders
Autoencoders, in the form of an encoder-decoder combination, were first introduced
by DeMers in 1992 [9]. Autoencoders seek to learn the representation of a set of data,
and reconstruct said data. Autoencoders have many practical applications such as noise
removal, data generation, dimensionality reduction, and image compression. Autoencoders
are a specific neural network structure, which seeks to take data X and reduce it to a latent
representation F using an encoder as shown in Equation 2.5. This latent representation is
then passed through decoding layers that results in the reconstructed sample X̂, which is
shown in Equation 2.6.
φ:X→
− F

(2.5)

ψ:F →
− X̂

(2.6)

Figure 3 shows the process of passing data X through the encoding layers shown
in blue, generating the latent representation F shown in red, which is then passed to the
decoding layers shown in yellow, yielding the reconstructed data X̂.
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Figure 3
Visual Depiction of Autoencoder

The encoder layers are standard, full interconnected feed forward neural network
layers, with each encoding layer having fewer nodes than the previous layer. The reduction
in nodes over the layers is what allows the data to be compressed into a reduced latent
representation F. For example, if the data originally has 100 features appearing at the input
layer, there may be a layer of 75 nodes followed by a layer of 50 nodes in the encoding
section of the autoencoder. Therefore, the latent space is then constructed with 50 values as
opposed to the 100 features used to originally describe the data. The encoder can be made
of any number of hidden layers. After the data are encoded into its latent representation
F, they are decoded into the reconstructed sample x̂. The decoder also consists of several
hidden layers, with increasing number of nodes from one layer to the next. The increase in
16

the number of nodes is what allows for the compressed latent data to be expanded back to
the original size.
The goal of the autoencoder is to learn the weights needed to compress x into some
latent space F and generate a reconstructed sample x̂ to be as close to x as possible. To
keep x̂ as close as possible to x, the autoencoder is trained to minimize some reconstruction
error, or difference, between x and x̂, where this difference can be computed using any LP
norm. In this work, we use the L2 norm. Equation 2.7 shows x̂ can be substituted with the
forward propagation of sample x through the encoder and decoder. Replacing x̂ allows one
to define the loss in terms of the weights of the encoder, decoder and sample x. In Equation
2.7 W and b refer to the weights and biases of the encoder, whereas W 0 and b0 refer to
the weights and biases of the decoder. With the loss in terms of X and the weights, the
network can be trained using backpropagation. In summary, an autoencoder is a specific
neural network architecture trained to minimize the difference between input and output,
and contains a latent representation of the data.
L(x, x̂) = ||x − x̂||p = ||x − σ(W 0 (σ(W x + b)) + b0 )||p

(2.7)

2.1.5 Denoising Autoencoder
Earliest discussions on denoising autoencoders were provided by Vincent et al. in
2008 [38]. Denoising autoencoders take in a corrupted input x
e, and pass it through the
autoencoder resulting in the auto-encoded sample x̂. The goal is to obtain an x̂ that is
very close to the original uncorrupted sample x with respect to some distance metric. The
corruption used by the authors involved setting random inputs to zero. Denoising autoen-
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coders are not restricted to a single form of corruption, however, and have been shown to
be effective with respect to Gaussian noise, uniform noise, and randomly setting values to
zero [38]. An important behavior of denoising autoencoders – which is employed in our
broad spectrum defense – is the ability of the autoencoder to project data back towards the
manifold. Figure 4 shows the black x marks laid on the data manifold and the corrupted x
e
that lie further away from the manifold. The blue x in Figure 4 shows a data point laying
on the data manifold. To train the autoencoder, the sample is corrupted by adding noise to
the data, this noise is bound by some radius from the original point (blue x), demonstrated
by the dotted red circle in Figure 4. When the x
e sample is passed through the denoising
autoencoder, it is brought closer to the data manifold, as indicated with the dotted purple
arrow in Figure 4. x
e can be moved along the dotted purple arrow towards the data manifold. Denoising autoencoders are trained with the goal of removing noise from the data.
Since adversarial data can be seen as adversarial noise, denoising autoencoders may be able
to mitigate the impact of an adversarial example. We will discuss how we use denoising
autoencoders in the development of the broad spectrum defense (BSD) in Chapter 4.
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Figure 4
Demonstration of Denoising Autoencoder adapted from [38]
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Chapter 3
Related Work: Evasion Attack and Defense Strategies
In order to develop a broad spectrum defense against evasion attacks, it is important
to understand the underlying premise and general characteristics of evasion attacks. Therefore, in this chapter, we first review a wide spectrum of evasion attacks that have been
developed over the last several years. This chapter will explore the strengths and weaknesses of each attack and the conditions under which they can be most effective. We then
look at some of the more effective defensive strategies developed against evasion attacks
and review their strengths and shortcomings.

3.1

Terminology and Expressions
Much of the existing work on evasion attacks introduce and use their preferred

nomenclature in referring to certain parameters and variables, even though similar parameters might have been defined by others for different attack strategies. In order to make their
comparison easier to follow, we first present a unified set of nomenclature for variables and
parameters as summarized below in Table 1.
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Table 1
Table of Variables
Variable
x

Name
Original data point

Description
Unmodified test sample

y

Original label

Unmodified label of the sample

x0

Adversarial sample

Sample with added adversarial perturbation

t

Target class

Class adversary desires for misclassification

I

Iterations

Number of iterations to run a loop

k

Confidence parameter

Confidence of selected adversarial example

θ

Network parameters

Parameters of neural network classifier

Z(x)

Logits resulting from x

Output of last layer of network before softmax

η

Perturbation

Changes added to image by adversary

α

Scaling factor

Parameter which scales perturbation

β

Elastic net weighting

Weighting between L1 and L2 norms



Perturbation bound

Upper bound to restrict perturbation

f

Neural network classifier

Neural network used for classification

f (x)

Softmax output

Softmax output values of sample x

x̂

Autoencoded version of x

The result of passing x through the autoencoder

C

Number of classes

Number of output classes and nodes

M

Number of features

Number of features or pixels in an image

Υ

Maximum distortion

Number of pixels acceptable to modify image

F

Flow field

Flow field defined over pixels of an image

3.2

Evasion Attacks
We now review some of the most common and well-established evasion attack

strategies. Many of these attacks are so-called gradient-based attacks, as the attack strategy
is based on minimizing (or maximizing) a cost function along its gradient. For each attack
strategy, we describe the underlying premise, its algorithmic pseudo-code, as well as its
strengths or shortcomings as appropriate. Note that an attack’s relative utility is often related to its date of conception and more recent attacks tend to generate stronger adversarial
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examples.
In all cases, the attacker creates the attack point x0 as a perturbation to a genuine
test data sample in the form of x0 = x + η, where η is the perturbation.
Attack samples were generated with the help of the Adversarial Robustness Toolbox
[32].

3.2.1 Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM)
The Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) is a simple yet effective attack method developed by Ian Goodfellow et al.. [15] FGSM utilizes the gradient of the cost function used
in the training of the classifier model (typically a neural network) to create adversarial examples. Equation 3.1 shows the general formulation of FGSM, where η is the perturbation
added to the genuine test sample x, x0 is the resulting attack point, y is the correct label,
and α is a factor for scaling the amount of perturbation added to the data. J (θ, x, y) is then
the cost function used to train the neural network, where θ are model parameters. We note
that, when used in a typical image data, η perturbs all pixels that contribute to increasing
the cost.

η = α sign(∇x J (θ, x, y))

(3.1)

FGSM is very sensitive to the α value as this scales the magnitude of the perturbation: lower values typically result in a low success rate (weak attack), whereas values that
are too high result in obvious and easy to detect attack points. For this reason, one should
attempt the attack with a set of various α values and verify that the resulting perturbed
samples are highly similar to the original unperturbed samples. The FGSM attack com22

putes the gradient of the cost function given the sample and label, the sign is then taken
and multiplied with α so the perturbation η will be α or −α. This η value is then added to
the pixel to create the modified adversarial example. Algorithm 1 demonstrates the FGSM
attack in two steps, in one step the gradient of the cost function is computed and η is set to
±α, finally, η is then applied to the image by adding it to the pixel value. The FGSM attack
was one of the first evasion attacks developed. The attack modifies the images pixels by
increasing and decreasing each pixel by a value of η causing an increase in the cost function eventually leading to misclassification. As the FGSM attack can be implemented with
low cost and it quickly generates adversarial samples, it can be used to rapidly evaluate the
baseline efficacy of any adversarial defense.

Algorithm 1 FGSM Attack Algorithm
J cost function
θ model parameters
α step size
η adversarial perturbation
1:
2:
3:
4:

procedure FGSM(α, J (θ, x, y))
η = α sign(∇x J (θ, x, y))
x0 = x + η
return x0

Figure 5 shows an example image from the TinyImageNet dataset with the FGSM
attack applied with different α values. Note that as α is increased the perturbation becomes
more obvious.
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Figure 5
FGSM Attack Applied to an Example Image from TinyImageNet

(a) Original Image (b) α = 0.03

(c) α = 0.3

(d) α = 3

3.2.2 Jacobian Saliency Map Attack (JSMA)
Another gradient-based method is the Jacobian Saliency Map Attack (JSMA) [33].
In this attack, saliency maps are constructed on the inputs of the neural network based
on the forward derivatives, which reveal enough information to craft strong adversarial
examples. The saliency map shows how much each pixel contributes towards the prediction
of the class for a given image. Knowing the pixels that contribute to a classification, the
attack can then modify these pixels forcing the image to be misclassified. The JSMA attack
is an L0 attack, which attempts to minimize the number of modified elements, or pixels.
The first step in JSMA is to compute the forward derivative of the network with respect to
the sample x as shown in Equation 3.2. In this equation xi refers to the ith pixel or feature
of image x, and j refers to the j th hidden layer of the network (f ), up to the total number
of hidden layers represented by N . The number of pixels range from 1 to M . In JSMA the
derivative of the network is taken directly to determine the contribution of the input pixels
on the output classification.
∇f (x) =

∂fj (x)
∂xi i:1,...,M ;j:1,...,N
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(3.2)

Next, a saliency map – as shown in Equation 3.3 – is computed using the gradient
for every input feature and the target class. This means that a matrix of size N × C is
needed, where N is the number of pixels in an image and C is the number of classes. For
each element of this matrix, the forward derivatives of the network with respect to x are
calculated recursively. This forward propagation of the gradient demonstrates the input
components’ contribution to the output classification. Algorithm 2 shows in line 5 that the
pixel with the maximum value imax in the sailency map S is selected for modification.

S(x, t)[i] =




 0, if

∂ft (x)
∂xi

< 0 or


P

 ( ∂ft (x) )| j6=t
∂xi

P

j6=t

∂fj (x)
|,
∂xi

∂fj (x)
∂xi

>0
(3.3)

otherwise

The attacker’s goal is to increase the probability of misclassification of the target
class, and decreasing the weighting of any other classification. If the gradient of a pixel
given the target class is negative, then the saliency map is assigned a zero for that feature.
Additionally, if the pixel’s gradient with respect to any other class is positive, the saliency
value is also set to zero as we would not want to increase the change of any classification
other than the target. However, if the gradient of the pixel given the target class is positive,
this positive gradient value is assigned to the sailency map for the given pixel, then by
changing this pixel we can steer the classification towards the target class. All of these
values generate the saliency map shown in Equation 3.3. The saliency map demonstrates
what pixels should be increased or decreased to classify the sample as the target class. The
last step involves a user defined parameter, Υ, which controls how many pixels can be
modified so the image remains recognizable to humans.
For an untargeted attack, the attack is performed for each given class with the ex-
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ception of the true class and the class resulting in the lowest L0 norm is selected.
JSMA is a computationally expensive attack, requiring large amount of memory to
run on larger datasets. For this reason we are unable to perform JSMA on the large neural
network used for classification of ImageNet.

Algorithm 2 JSMA Attack Algorithm
f neural network
σ magnitude of change to introduce to the feature
t target class
Υ maximum distortion
δx number of features currently changed from the original
Input: x, t, f, Υ, σ
1: x0 ← x
2: η = 0
3: while f (x0 ) 6= t and ||η|| < Υ do
4:
Generate saliency map S using Equation 3.3
5:
Modify x0imax by σ s.t. imax = argmaxi S(x0 , t)[i]
6:
η ← x0 − x
7: return x0

Figure 6 shows an example image from the TinyImageNet dataset with the JSMA
attack applied with different σ values. As σ is increased, the perturbations become more
obvious.
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Figure 6
JSMA Attack Applied to an Example Image from TinyImageNet

(a) Original Image (b) σ = 0.001

(c) σ = 0.01

(d) σ = 0.1

3.2.3 Projected Gradient Decent (PGD)
PGD is the process of performing multiple update steps descending the negative loss
function [27]. By performing this optimization, the loss is increased leading to a sample’s
misclassification. PGD attacks show that by taking multiple FGSM steps and projecting the
sample back to some  ball, attack point placement can be optimized resulting in a more
powerful sample in exchange for additional computational cost. In Equation 3.4, xt is the
current placement of the sample, xt+1 refers to the updated attack point after step t, P is
the projection of the sample back towards the  ball around the original sample, α is the
step size, and ∇x J (θ, x, y) is the gradient of the cost as seen in FGSM.
xt+1 = P (xt + α sign(∇x J (θ, x, y)))

(3.4)

If only one step of PGD is performed, then the attack equates to FGSM. The power of PGD
comes from taking multiple steps ascending the loss function and projecting back towards
the original sample. The projection step of PGD prevents the optimization from generating
samples that are perceptually different from the original target sample. PGD outperforms
FGSM and results in stronger adversarial samples, and hence a stronger attack. PGD’s
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stronger performance comes at a higher computational expense, but PGD does scale to
large architectures, unlike JSMA that requires a much larger amount of available memory.
Algorithm 3 PGD Attack Algorithm
I number of iterations
α step size of attack
∇x J (θ, x, y) gradient of the cost
 the radius of the ball which attack points are projected to
S a random location inside the  ball around the sample
Input: α, , J (θ, x, y), S
1: x0 ← S
2: for i = 0 to I do
3:
x0 = x0 + α sign(∇x0 J (θ, x0 , y))
4:
x0 = max(min(x0 , ), −)
5: return x0

Figure 7 shows an example image from the TinyImageNet dataset with the PGD
attack applied with different  values. Note that the smaller  values result in very minor
changes to the original image while the largest  value results in a very obvious adversarial
example.

Figure 7
PGD Attack Applied to an Example Image from TinyImageNet

(a) Original Image (b)  = 0.03

(c)  = 0.3
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(d)  = 3

3.2.4 DeepFool
DeepFool is a more recent attack strategy that finds the decision boundary for each
class, after finding the decision boundaries it projects the sample onto the closest classes
decision boundary and then the sample is pushed past the boundary forcing a missclassification [30]. Algorithm 4 demonstrates the process for creating a DeepFool adversarial
example. The DeepFool attack works by iterating until the classification of the original
sample x differs from the classification of the generated adversarial sample x0 . For ever
class y 0 in the set of all classes C besides the correct class, the difference in gradients are
computed and the difference in logit values are computed. For example line 4 of Algorithm 4 shows wk0 ← ∇Fk (x0 ) − ∇Fk(x) (x0 ), here the difference in gradients between the
adversarial sample and a given adversarial class are subtracted from the gradients of the
original sample and original class. This same process is repeated in line 5 for the output
values associated with each class. The class that has the closest logit values divided by
gradients is then declared ˆl, which is the class with the closest decision boundary. Next, we
calculate ri , the minimal vector to project x onto the closest decision boundary computed
in line 6. This computed ri value is added to x0 and the loop is repeated. When the sample
is misclassified the loop is finished and the sample is finally generated by generating the
final perturbation η by summing over all r values and the final adversarial sample x + η is
returned.
The DeepFool attack takes a different approach from the previously mentioned attack as
instead of performing gradient decent on the loss function, the DeepFool attack finds the
closest decision boundary, perturbs the sample towards that boundary and recursively re-
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peats the process until the sample is misclassified. The DeepFool method generates strong
adversarial examples with moderate computational complexity and scales well to large architectures. The DeepFool attack is considered a very strong attack and is very useful in
bench-marking adversarial defenses.

Algorithm 4 DeepFool Attack Algorithm
f model
x original sample
w0 stores the difference in gradients
f 0 store the difference in logit values
C set of all classes
y Original class
ˆl closest class to the original
I Maximum Number of iterations
Input: x, f
1: x0 ← x, i ← 0
2: while argmax f (x0 ) = y and i < I do
3:
for y 0 ∈ C where y 0 6= y do
4:
wy0 0 ← ∇fy0 (x0 ) − ∇fy (x)
5:
fy0 0 ← fy0 (x0 ) − fy (x)
0
ˆl ← argmin |f0y0 | 2
6:
7:

ri ←

y 0 6=y
|f 0 |
l̂

||w0 ||2
l̂
0

||wy0 ||

wl̂0

x0 ← x + ri
i←i+1
P
10: η =
i ri
11: return x + η
8:
9:

Figure 8 shows an example image from the TinyImageNet dataset with the DeepFool attack applied with different maximum iteration (I) values. In this case the parameter
of maximum iteration has no impact on the sample generated as a valid adversarial example
is found before 10 iterations so the samples show with 10, 100, and 1000 are the same.
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Figure 8
DeepFool Attack Applied to an Example Image from TinyImageNet

(a) Original Image (b) I = 0.03

(c) I = 0.3

(d) I = 3

3.2.5 Carlini Wagner Attack
The Carlini Wagner (CW) attack attempts to simultaneously solve the min-max
problem of minimizing the distance from the original sample to the adversarial example
while also maximizing the likelihood that the sample is misclassified [5]. The CW attack
differs from other attacks in one critical way: instead of simply constraining the attack
to a certain perturbation, the amount of perturbation is dynamically solved to achieve an
optimal trade off between attack strength and detectability. The distance metric utilized
can be any of the L0 , L2 , or L∞ norms. The Carlini-Wagner attack solves the multifaceted
optimization problem of minimizing the distance between the adversarial sample and the
true sample while also forcing the classification of the sample to the target class. One of
the most sensitive parameters in the CW attack is the confidence k. A confidence value
of zero returns adversarial samples that have a small difference in logit values between the
most probable class and second most probable class. This small difference between output
values can be interpreted as the classifier having low confidence that the prediction is correct. For example, there may only be a one percent difference between output nodes of a
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network. A higher confidence (k) value results in a larger gap between the most probable
and second most probable classes. For example if a confidence of 0 is selected, and the
original class of the attack sample is class-3, the sample may be classified as class-4 with
the corresponding (highest) output being .5 and the second highest output (being that of
class-3) with a value of .4. In this case the model would report the desired class, but with
low “confidence”. In certain critical classification operations, individuals analyze the outputs of a neural network and in this case if the attacker uses a low k (confidence value) it
could tip off a knowledgeable end user.

Equation 3.5 shows the formulation of the Carlini Wagner L2 attack. In this formulation,
the || 12 (tanh(ω) + 1) − x||22 term minimizes the difference between the adversarial sample and the original sample. This distance ensures the created adversarial sample is highly
similar to the original sample. The c · F ( 12 (tanh(ω) + 1)) term describes the strength of the
adversarial example. The c term is found by performing a line search over values of c to
find the best solution to minimizing Equation 3.5. The c term encourages the solver to minimize both portions of Equation 3.5 simultaneously instead of optimizing over each term
sequentially. Equation 3.5 represents the adversarial example x0 as 21 (tanh(ω) + 1) where
ω is the variable we are solving. The change of variables is used to ensure that the new adversarial example will have values between 0 and 1. This is ensured as −1 ≤ tanh(ω) ≤ 1,
so it follows that 0 ≤ x + η ≤ 1. The adversarial sample x0 is equal to x + η and also
equates to tanh(ω). The function F is applied in Equation 3.5 and is explained in Equation
3.6. Equation 3.6 is selecting the maximum logit value Z(x0 )i where the selected class i
cannot be that of the target class t. This condition ensures the sample is classified as the
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target class. The logit value of the desired target class Z(x0 )t is subtracted from the largest
logit value Z(x0 )i . The difference in logit values is then compared to the confidence k, if
the difference in logit values is lower than −k, the value returned is −k. When optimizing
this attack, the parameter k encourages the solver to find an adversary x0 which is classified
as t with a high confidence, this higher confidence often comes with a larger distance from
the original sample so this trade off must be considered.



1
1
2
minimize || (tanh(ω) + 1) − x||2 + c · F ( (tanh(ω) + 1))
2
2

(3.5)

F (x0 ) = max{−k, max[Z(x0 )i ] − Z(x0 )t }

(3.6)

i6=t

The Carlini Wagner attack currently stands as one of the strongest evasion attacks. Due
to the simultaneous minimization of the distance and maximization of the strength of the
samples, the attack generates perceptually similar adversarial examples that cause the classifier to incorrectly classify the sample with very high confidence. The added power of
the Carlini Wagner attack comes with added computational overhead compared to a simple
attack like FGSM, but the added computational expense is often warranted to generate such
quality and effective adversarial examples.
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Algorithm 5 Carlini Wagner Attack Algorithm
x original sample
k confidence parameter
t target class
Z Logit Values (Pre softmax)
I Iterations
η perturbation
Input: x, k, t, I, Z
1: for j in Binary Search Steps do
2:
Select c by minimize (||η||22 + c · f (x + η)))
1
3:
(tanh(ω) + 1) = x0 = x + η
2
4:
for i = 0 to I do

5:
minimize || 21 (tanh(ω) + 1) − x||22 + c · F ( 12 (tanh(ω) + 1))
6:
Perform optimization step with Adam and updating ω
0
7: x = tanh(ω)
8: return x0

Figure 9 shows a sample image from the TinyImageNet dataset with the CW attack
applied with different confidence (k) values. In this case the images look extremely similar,
but all of the images generated are imperceptibly different. Recall that higher k values
encourage the solver to generate examples with larger differences on the output of the
neural network while smaller k values allow smaller differences between the outputs of the
network. In this case, all of the generated examples look identical to the human eye.
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Figure 9
Carlini Wagner Attack Applied to a Sample Image from TinyImageNet

(a) Original Image (b) k = 0

(c) k = 10

(d) k = 100

3.2.6 Elastic Net Attack
Elastic net attack is a special case of the Carlini Wagner attack [6]. Equation 3.7
shows the objective function that is minimized to find an elastic net attack adversarial sample. The c · max{−k, max[Z(x0 )i ] − Z(x0 )t } term of this equation is identical to the Carlini
i6=t

Wagner attack, in the β||x0 − x||1 + ||x0 − x||22 term instead of just minimizing the L2 distance, the elastic net representation is used where the L1 and L2 norms are minimized and
the weighting is decided by β. In the elastic net attack, the change of variable approach
used by Carlini no longer works due to the addition of the L1 norm.

g(x) = c · max{−k, max[Z(x0 )i ] − Z(x0 )t } + β||x0 − x||1 + ||x0 − x||22
i6=t

x0 = Sβ (x0 − α∇g(x0 ))





min{zi − β, 1}, if zi − x0i > β





[Sβ (z)]i = x0i ,
if |zi − x0i | ≤ β








max{z + β, 0}, if z − x < −β
i

i
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0i

(3.7)
(3.8)

(3.9)

For this reason, the iterative shrinkage-thresholding algorithm (ISTA) is used. ISTA, described by Equation 3.9, performs an additional step of shrinking and thresholding at each
iteration. The elastic net attack can generate adversarial examples stronger than the Carlini
Wagner attack as it considers both the L1 and L2 norms, while also shrinking and thresholding the perturbation (x0 − α∇g(x0 )) at every step. The ISTA process is similar to the
projection back to the  ball explained in the PGD attack. Utilizing both L1 and L2 norms
to constrain the attack resulting in a sample with low total perturbation over the image (L1 )
and low average perturbation over the image (L2 ). The β parameter shown in Equation 3.9
is used shrink the deviation from the original pixel value if the deviation is greater than
β and does not change the pixel value if the deviation is less than β. The pesudocode of
elastic net attack is listed in Algorithm 6. Lines 5 to 7 of the algorithm demonstrate that the
best adversarial example for each original sample is selected as a sample that is misclassified with the lowest distortion metrics. The distortion metric used for the EAD attack can
be a combination of L1 and L2 (Elastic-Net) or the L1 distortion relative to x.
The Elastic Net attack was developed as an extension of the Carlini Wagner attack
so it brings all of the strengths of the Carlini Wagner attack such as generating high quality
imperceptible adversarial examples. The Elastic Net attack also introduces another parameter, β; if this parameter is tuned correctly, the Elastic Net attack can outperform the Carlini
Wagner attack. However, if this parameter is not tuned correctly, the Elastic Net attack can
generate weaker attack samples. If one wishes to generate the strongest adversarial attack
with the Elastic Net attack, they should ensure that the β parameter is tuned correctly by
performing a search over a range of β values to find the value that works best for your
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classifier and data. If one is constrained by computational cost, however, it would be best
to use the Carlini Wagner attack instead of the Elastic Net attack.

Algorithm 6 Elastic Net Attack Algorithm
β Elastic Net Norm Weighting
x original sample
α step size
I maximum number of iterations
Input: x, β, α, I
1: Initialization: x(0) = y (0) = x0
2: for j = 0 to I − 1 do
3:
x(j+1) = Sβ (y (j) − α∇g(y (k) ))
j
(x(j+1) − x(j) )
4:
y (j+1) = x(j+1) + j+3
X = {argmax(f (x(j) )) 6= argmax(f (x))}Ij=1
for x0 ∈ X do
select x0 with lowest Elastic Net or L1 distance from x
8: return x0

5:
6:
7:

Figure 10 shows a sample image from the TinyImageNet dataset with the EAD
attack applied with different confidence (β) values. As the β value is increased the L1
norm is weighted more heavily and the L2 norm is given less weight. This is demonstrated
by Figure 10 as sub-image b shows modified values over many pixels and sub-image d with
a β of 1 shows stronger modifications made to fewer pixels.
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Figure 10
Elastic Net Attack Applied to a Sample Image from TinyImageNet

(a) Original Image (b) β = 0

(c) β = 0.5

(d) β = 1

3.2.7 Spatial Attack
One example of an attack that does not utilize an LP norm is the Spatial Attack
[39]. All of the previously mentioned attacks use some form of an LP norm to constrain
or limit the perturbation to make sure that the generated adversarial sample looks similar
to the original. The spatial attack is the first attack presented that is limited to image data,
all previously mentioned attacks work on any form of data. To create spatial adversarial
examples, the authors begin by defining a per-pixel flow field F to create adversarial sample
x0 using pixels from the input x. The flow field defines a mapping of how the image
will be perturbed. Let x0(i) denote the i-th pixel of the image with flow field coordinates
(u0(i) , v 0(i) ). The amount of displacement in each image dimension is optimized using the
flow vector Fi := (∆u(i) , ∆v (i) ). This flow vector relates the adversarial pixel x0(i) to the
corresponding pixel in the original image x(i) . If the flow vector is solved around for x(i)
then, (u(i) , v (i) ) = (u0(i) +∆u(i) , v 0(i) +∆v (i) ). The values of (u(i) , v (i) ) exist on a continuous
spectrum so the differentiable bilinear interpolation is used to create the adversarial image.
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Now x0(i) can be calculated as:
x0(i) =

X

x(q) (1 − |u(i) − u(q) |)(1 − |v (i) − v (q) |)

(3.10)

q∈N (u(i) ,v (i) )

N (u(i) , v (i) ) contains the four neighboring pixels from (u(i) , v (i) ) corresponding to the topleft, top-right, bottom-left, and bottom-right pixels. Equation 3.10 then yields the adversarial image when calculated over all pixels.
Other works rely on the use of an LP norm to constrain the perturbation, in this work a new
regularization loss, the Lf low loss is used to minimize the local distortion within the image.
Given an image x, the optimal flow field F ∗ is obtained by minimizing:
F ∗ = argmin(Ladv (x, F) + τ Lf low (F))

(3.11)

F

Here, the two terms represent the attackers two goals. The first term Ladv encourages the
adversarial examples to be misclassified by the target classifier. The second term Lf low
exists to minimize the local distortion. The τ parameter exists to allow tuning of the trade
off between the two terms. This τ term resembles the c term from the Carlini Wagner attack
as both terms control the strength vs detectability trade off.
The Ladv term is constructed to represent the goal, in a targeted attack, argmax f (x0 ) =
t where t is the target class which does not equal the ground truth label y. To reiterate, in
an untargeted attack, the target can be any label besides the ground truth. The objective
function for Ladv follows the implementation by Carlini and Wagner.
Ladv (x, F) = max(max [Z(x0 )i ] − Z(x0 )t , −k)
i6=t

(3.12)

In Equation 3.12 Z(x) represents the logit values on input x, Z(x)i represents the i-th
element of the logit vector also known as the logit value of the i-th class. k is used to define
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the confidence level of the attack. The k parameter controls the gap between confidences of
the attack class and all other classes. At low k values, the difference between any other class
and the target class must be at least a value of k. As the k value increases the targeted class
will result in a higher logit value while the other classes’ logit values decrease. This larger
separation between logit values implies that the classifier believe the adversarial example
with high confidence, which is where the confidence parameter k gets its name.
Lf low is computed using the sum of spacial movement distance between any two adjacent
pixels. Given a pixel p and its neighbors N (p), Lf low is defined as:
all pixels

Lf low (F) =

X
p

X q
||∆u(p) − ∆u(q) ||22 + ||∆v (p) − ∆v (q) ||22

(3.13)

q∈N (p)

By minimizing Equation 3.13 the perceptual quality can be maintained as adjacent pixels
tend to move in similar directions and distances. Equation 3.13 quantifies the difference
between pixels and their neighbors in the flow field. The difference is found by summing
the squares of ∆u(p) − ∆u(q) and ∆v (p) − ∆v (q) and taking the square root. The process is
repeated for every pixel and its corresponding neighbors.

The Spatial Attack is capable of generating strong adversarial examples using a method
substantially different from traditional LP norm attacks. In developing a broad spectrum
defense, one must verify the defense offers improved robustness against non-LP norm attacks. Testing against non-LP norm attacks reveals information about how well the defense
can generalize to unseen attacks. The strength of the Spatial Attack comes at the cost of
additional computational overhead as the loss function now involves computing statistics
over all pixels in the image in addition to the loss function used by Carlini and Wagner.
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Figure 11 shows the original test image and the result of applying the spatial attack
with different τ values. All images shown appear identical demonstrating that varying
the τ parameters does not significantly modify the perception of the generated adversarial
sample.

Figure 11
Spatial Attack Applied to an Example Image from TinyImageNet

(a) Original Image (b) τ = 1

(c) τ = 10

(d) τ = 100

3.2.8 Shadow Attack
The Shadow Attack is another form of a non-LP norm attack. In the Shadow Attack,
the adversarial example is constrained by three different penalty terms [13]. Similar to the
Spatial attack, the constraints are designed assuming that the input is an image. Equation
3.14 introduces the equation used to find the η or the perturbation added to the original
sample to yield the adversarial sample x0 = x + η. Equation 3.14 shows that the loss is
to be maximized while minimizing the three terms controlled by λc , λtv , and λs . The λ
values ensure that aspects of the adversarial image remain very close to the original image
yielding a strong sample. Applying the aforementioned constraints force the sample to
look indistinguishable from the original while forcing an increase in the loss causing the
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misclassification of the sample.
max[L(θ, x + η) − λc C(η) − λtv T V (η) − λs Dissim(η)]
η

(3.14)

The T V (η) term constrains the total variation across the image, encouraging the
smoothness within the image. Following the terminology used above, η describes the
perturbation added to the data. The total variation term is defined in Equation 3.15, the
anisotropic total variation describes the difference in vertical and horizontal components of
the perturbation.

T V (ηi,j ) = anisotropic-TV(ηi,j )2 = (Σ|ηi+1,j − ηi,j | + |ηi,j+1 − ηi,j |)2
i,j

(3.15)

The C(η) constrains the change in mean of each color channel. C(η) is defined in
Equation 3.16. In this equation, the element wise absolute value is taken of each channel
and the average of the absolute values is computed.

C(η) = ||Avg(|ηR |), Avg(|ηG |), Avg(|ηB |)||22

(3.16)

The last penalty term, Dissim(η) focuses on maintaining the color balance of the
image. This term will keep the perturbations to the red, green, and blue channels similar
so the resulting perturbation to the image will minimally disturb the color balance and will
result in a darker or lighter pixel. There are two forms of the Dissim(η) term, the first
method generates a single array to represent all color channels, and is called 1-channel,
and in this case Dissim(η) = 0 as all channels change together. The other case is where all
three channels can be modified, in this case the Dissim(η) is defined in Equation 3.17.
Dissim(η) = ||(ηR − ηG )2 , (ηR − δB )2 , (ηG − ηB )2 ||
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(3.17)

Equation 3.17 shows that the dissimilarity in the 3-channel scenario is quantified
as the squared difference between each pair of color channels. This metric encourages the
perturbations applied to each color channel to be similar to the perturbations applied to
other channels.
It is important to note that the Shadow attack does not directly constrain the LP
norm of the generated adversarial samples. The Shadow attack ensures the adversarial
image looks similar to the original with out explicitly restricting the LP norm. Due to
the potentially high LP norm values, the attack can be effective against defenses that only
evaluate robustness against LP norm attacks.
Figure 12 shows an example image from the TinyImageNet dataset with the Shadow
attack applied with different total variation (λtv ) weightings. In this case the parameter of
total variation did not significantly change the output image and in all cases the images
generated appeared to be a darker version of the original (hence the name, shadow attack).

Figure 12
Shadow Attack Applied to an Example Image from TinyImageNet

(a) Original Image (b) λtv = 0.3

(c) λtv = 0.6
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(d) λtv = 0.9

3.3

Existing Defense Theory
Existing defenses vary greatly in their approaches. Some defenses attempt to utilize

information about attacks to defend the feature space of the model. Other defenses try to
flag and remove potential adversarial samples. One commonality is the trade off between
model security and impact on non-adversarial data, a defense that can correctly identify
a majority of adversarial samples comes at the expense of incorrectly identifying benign
samples as adversarial. One example of this trade off is the tuning of evasion detectors.
Detectors trained to detect evasion attacks attempt to remove adversarial samples, these
defenses do not need to return a classification if the sample is deemed adversarial. Some
detectors can detect these adversaries at a high rate, but the high detection rate comes at the
expense of falsely detecting some non-adversarial data as well.

3.3.1 Adversarial Training
Adversarial training (AT) is a defensive method that relies on crafting attack samples and training the classifier on these attack samples. The central premise of this defense
is that by training on the attack samples, the defender can hope to define and learn the feature space around these adversarial samples and – when one appears – the model will return
the proper classification. One potential problem with adversarial training is that it can be
considered as a reactive approach, where the defender is utilizing information about existing and known attacks to craft a defense. Since adversarial training is a reactive approach,
it is unlikely that the defense would generalize to new attacks, as it was trained specifically
with one type of attack. Goodfellow et al. argue that the adversarial samples used to train
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the defense appropriately approximate the adversarial space [15]. The adversarial space is
incredibly large and it is unlikely that adversarial training would provide adequate coverage
over every “nook and cranny” in the entire adversarial space. The AT defense has shown
strong performance against samples that were slightly perturbed using strong attacks such
as the Carlini Wagner attack, but they can be vulnerable to fundamentally different attacks
such as Spatial and Shadow attacks. To address ATs vulnerability to Spatial attacks, Zhang
and Wang proposed AT while incorporating spatial attack samples [41]. Their paper also
showed that in exchange for the added robustness, overall performance decreased. Zhang
and Wang demonstrate that adversarial training is a reactive defense that relies on knowledge of existing attacks to make the defense robust.

3.3.2 Detectors
A different approach to adversarial example defenses utilizes detectors. Detectorbased defenses aim to remove adversarial points as opposed to adversarial training, which
attempts to return the correct classification for adversarial samples. As the detectors do
not have to return a classification, the idea is to detect anomalies that are suspected to be
adversarial. Detectors also offer a simpler solution to adversarial examples as they do not
have to give a classification. For some attack samples with larger perturbations, it can be
very difficult to recover the correct classification. One example of such situation would an
image of random values. It is impossible to know the correct classification, but in this case,
a detector based defense can simply reject the sample.
There are several detector-based defenses with varying levels of success. Typically, the performances of detector-based approaches are dataset specific – some performing well only
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on more simplistic datasets such as MNIST or CIFAR10, whereas others only perform well
against datasets such as ImageNet. Another problem with some detector-based defenses is
they may work well against LP attacks such as the Carlini Wagner attack, but they may
not work well against a spatial attack or shadow attack that is not constrained on the LP
norm. A comparison of different detector methods is listed in Table 2. This table shows
that most detector-based defenses are trained using existing adversarial examples. Using
adversarial examples to train the detectors has the consequence of constraining the defense
to perform well only on similar style attacks, limiting the defenses’ ability to generalize
to other existing or future attacks. Each defense in Table 2 was also evaluated against the
Carlini Wagner attack, whose results are also displayed in Table 2. Defenses selected for
comparison in this work had to meet the criteria of performing well on Carlini Wagner
attack and not requiring adversarial data to train. These criteria resulted in the comparison
of Feature Squeezing, MagNet, and the (proposed) broad spectrum defense.
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Table 2
Comparison of Detector Based Defenses
Defense
Hendrycks’s [17]

Effective on
Carlini Wagner
x

Trained Using
Adversarial Data
X

Li’s [22]
Grosse’s [16]
Gong’s [14]

x
X
X

x
X
X

Bhagoji’s [2]

x

X

Feinman’s [12]
Metzen’s [29]
RBF-SVM [25]
Feature Squeezing (FS) [40]

x
x
X
X

X
X
X
x

Noise Reduction (NR) [23]
Steganalysis [24]

X
X

X
X

MagNet [28]

X

x

3.3.2.a Feature Squeezing. Feature Squeezing is a defense with a demonstrated
strong performance against all datasets for L0 and L2 norm attacks [40]. Feature Squeezing
is not trained using adversarial examples, and therefore no inherent bias is introduced when
deploying this defense. Feature squeezing works by applying filters to images to create a
new image, with the hope that the new image will remove adversarial perturbations. The
authors decide to apply two styles of filters, a color depth filter and spatial filters. The
color depth filter simply reduces the number of bits available for all colors, for example a
gray-scale image is 8-bit and contains 256 values for each pixel, a reduced version could be
a 4-bit image that contains 16 values for each pixel. Color images by default are 24-bit (8
bit over 3 channels), which contain about 16 million different colors. Bit depth reduction
47

can bring this down to 12-bit or 4096 colors.
Feature squeezing also uses a variety of spatial filters such as Gaussian smoothing, mean
smoothing, or median smoothing. These methods are considered local methods as they
make use of nearby pixels to smooth the pixel in question. These filters are applied pixel
by pixel across the whole image. Other spatial filters utilized include non-local methods
that smooth over a broader area. For example, non-local methods find similar patches over
an area of the image and replace the center of the patches with the average of the similar
patches.
The Feature Squeezing defense, depicted in Figure 13, uses the squeezers to preprocess
the data, generating additional predictions for each sample. For each filter, the outputs of
the neural network are taken and subtracted from the outputs of the neural network on the
original sample. If the squeezed images output minus the original images output exceeds
the threshold, the sample is rejected as adversarial.
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Figure 13
Feature Squeezing Block Diagram adapted from [40]
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Squeezer2
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No

L2

d2

Legitimate

In describing their feature squeezing approach, the authors demonstrate that when
the correct combination of filters are selected for any given dataset, feature squeezing is
robust to L2 and L0 attacks [40]. Unfortunately, they also show that even with the best
possible filter selection, this defense only recognizes 20.8% and 55% of Fast Gradient Sign
Method (FGSM) and Basic Iterative Method (BIM) samples on CIFAR-10 (L∞ attacks).
FGSM and BIM are not computationally expensive, and are often some of the first attacks attempted. On the ImageNet dataset, the FGSM and BIM based adversarial samples
once again evade the defense with rates of 43% and 64.4%. Feature squeezing demonstrates strong performance on other attacks such as the Carlini Wagner attack and Jacobian
Saliency Map Attack (JSMA). Feature Squeezing makes an excellent benchmark defense
as it defends against the Carlini Wagner attack across a variety of datasets and does not
require adversarial data to create the defense.
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3.3.2.b MagNet: A Dual Detector Approach. MagNet is a detector based defense
that seeks to either remove or reform adversarial examples. MagNet seeks to detect and
remove adversarial examples without training the model on adversarial data. As the defense does not have access to adversarial data, it must attempt to approximate the boundary
between the adversarial and legitimate data. This defense passes a test sample x through an
autoencoder yielding x̂, the auto-encoded version of x. The reconstruction error between
x̂ and x is then calculated and compared to a threshold. This reconstruction error can also
be described as the distance between x̂ and x. A legitimate sample would be expected to
have a small reconstruction error as the autoencoder was trained to minimize the distance
between the input and outputs of the autoencoder. An adversarial sample may exist in a
subspace of the autoencoder that is not well defined and can return a larger reconstruction error. The second detector used in MagNet is called the Jensen-Shannon Divergence
(JSD) detector. The JSD detector calculates the Jensen-Shannon Divergence between F (x)
and F (x̂), where F (x) refers to the softmax values at the output of the network. If the
difference in JSD values exceeds a threshold then the sample is deemed adversarial and is
removed. The threshold is defined as a percentage, and the percentage selected corresponds
to the amount of acceptable false positive detections. The JSD detector is added to remove
samples with low reconstruction errors that induce a large change in the outputs of the network. The samples found by the JSD detector have an unusually high change in the outputs
of the network, this usually implies that the sample is adversarial causing this massive shift
in output values. If the sample passes both detectors, then the resulting classification Ŷ is
considered the predicted classification.
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Figure 14 shows a block diagram of the MagNet defense. The diagram shows the
the autoencoder, and the model (also known as the classifier). The original sample x is
passed through the model yielding the classification Z(x). x is also passed through the
autoencoder yielding the auto-encoded version of x, x̂. The auto-encoded sample is also
passed through the same model yielding the classification Z(X̂). The diagram demonstrates using the sample, an autoencoder, and softmax outputs of the model, adversarial
samples can be detected. If a sample is not detected as adversarial by the JSD or reconstruction error detectors then the final classification is returned as Z(x̂).

Figure 14
MagNet Block Diagram

MagNet and the detectors used in MagNet are explored in detail in chapter 4.
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3.3.2.c Adaptive Noise Reduction. A different detector-based defense is Adaptive
Noise Reduction, a defense that modifies an original image by applying transformations,
and then compares the resulting images’ classification to the classification of the original
[23]. The idea here is that if an image is adversarial by applying some filters, some image
close to the original can be recovered and the classification for the adversarial and original
will not match. In the adaptive noise reduction defense different filters are applied to the
image, this generates new slightly different images. Adaptive noise reduction states that if
the classification of these new images differs from the original image, the sample is likely
adversarial. The rationale is that neural networks should be robust to small changes within
an image and the network would be expected to retrieve the correct classification. Adversarial samples are caused by minor imperceptible changes to the image and the filters can
disturb the delicately crafted adversarial sample and force a change in classification.

Adaptive noise reduction has many hyperparameters that need to be selected to fit the
problem. To select these hyperparameters, the authors use a validation set to generate
FGSM attack points and tune the parameters to these attack points. This tuning process has
the unintentional consequence of biasing the defense towards detecting FGSM generated
adversarial samples and/or samples that behave similar to those generated by FGSM. This
shortcoming was demonstrated when the authors found that the defense fails against simple
attacks such as the L0 (Jacobian Saliency Map Attack) JSMA. JSMA samples are relatively
easy to craft and they bypass the adaptive noise reduction defense at ease - a significant
problem for the defense. Another issue is that the epsilons used were hand picked to be
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very small numbers. Recall from Section 3.2.2 that the epsilon values control how much
the attack perturbs the sample. The theory is that if the epsilon is too large the resulting attack point (adversarial sample) can be recognized by a human, but adaptive noise reduction
shows that as epsilon increases the detection rate decreases. This defense does not have
any way of handling larger epsilon values that may be slightly visible but still difficult for
a human to detect. Larger epsilon attack samples may still evade a humans perception and
should be evaluated against. In this paper the authors only demonstrate performance on
the Carlini Wagner attack from k = 0 to k = 4, whereas other works have shown results
for k = 0 to k = 40. The authors have shown that as the confidence is increased to 4
the detection rate of this method diminishes. Adaptive noise reduction does not include
any mechanisms to handle these attack samples with larger perturbations so it would be
expected that the downward trend would continue towards k = 40. This paper also states
that adaptive noise reduction does not perform well against larger perturbations such as
those induced by L0 attacks such as the JSMA. Based on performance against L0 attacks, it
appears that adaptive noise reduction would also suffer in performance against spatial and
shadow attacks as they tend to introduce even larger perturbations than L0 attacks.
3.4

Shortcomings of Current Approaches

3.4.1 Certified Robustness Within an  Ball
One major limitation of existing adversarial defenses is their inability to work
across a variety of attacks with a variety of  values. Many of the more recently proposed defenses attempt to argue some level of certifiable robustness. Certifiable robustness
shows a defense’s resilience to attack within some  ball of the original image. In practice,
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certifiable robustness helps to defend against stronger attacks, such as the Carlini Wagner
attack, but as soon as the epsilon parameter of the attack is increased the defense no longer
offers any claims on robustness. Certifiable robustness relies on that epsilon ball, but some
attacks do not utilize distance metrics when crafting points. One example of such an attack
is the shadow attack. In shadow attack, the loss is maximized but the constraint is hand
crafted to keep the attack image similar to the original [13]. This local distortion can create rather high  values, but these attack samples can remain indistinguishable to humans.
Ghiasi et al. demonstrate that by using the shadow attack, they can even create samples
that evade defenses that were supposed to be robust within the  ball.

3.4.2 Training on Adversarial Data
Another issue with many existing defenses is the requirement that the training data
for the defense must include adversarial examples. Using adversarial examples during
training allows for high accuracy for detecting similar types of adversarial examples, that
use similar attacks. When a defense strategy relies on adversarial data, the defender is
explicitly showing (and training) the defense the kind of examples the adversary may use.
This logic is fundamentally flawed as it is impossible to predict a priori and subsequently
represent the entire adversarial space. One simple example of the vastness of the adversarial
space is the non-LP norm attacks. These attacks are structurally different than LP norm
based attacks. Non-LP norm attacks bypass defenses trained with LP norm attack data
achieving high success rates.
A more effective approach to create a robust defense that can generalize is to define
the region of true data, rather than that of the adversarial data. Any data that exist outside
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of the “true data” region can then be deemed adversarial.

3.4.3 Inability to Generalize to Other Datasets
It is perhaps unreasonable to expect a given defense to work on all datasets. In
particular, certain defenses that work on simpler datasets may not work on more complex
datasets. For example, some simple defenses work very well on the MNIST dataset, but
do not scale to larger datasets such as ImageNet and CIFAR-100 [16] [14] [17] [2] [12].
However, perhaps more curiously, the opposite problem also occurs: for example, a detector based defense using Steganalysis (the process of detecting concealed messages inside
another message) was proposed by Liu et al. [24]. This defense performs very well on
ImageNet, but the defense fails on the simpler / smaller MNIST and CIFAR-10 datasets, as
they cannot provide enough samples to construct the features required for the defense.
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Chapter 4
A Broad Spectrum Defense Against Evasion Adversarial Attacks
The goal of the proposed defense is to detect and remove adversarial attack points,
and return the correct classification for the remaining data. A desired characteristic for
our proposed defense is the ability to generalize across a variety of models, datasets, and
attacks. We strive to create a truly robust defense capable of generalizing to existing and
future attacks. While the performance against all attacks may not be perfect, we seek to
develop a defense that offers meaningful improvement over the lack of a defense in all
cases. As such, we refer to our approach as broad spectrum defense.

4.1

Inspiration for Proposed Defense
Our inspiration for the broad spectrum defense (BSD) comes from MagNet: a Two-

Pronged Defense against Adversarial Examples [28]. MagNet has demonstrated itself as a
strong defense against evasion attacks on the MNIST and CIFAR10 datasets. The formulation of the MagNet defense also allows for a great deal of flexibility as the defense can
scale to larger datasets and networks. The added overhead comes in the form of training a
more robust autoencoder. The performance of MagNet against a variety of attacks has been
evaluated, and it has been found that the performance suffers on non-LP norm attacks [37].
Carlini and Wagner also demonstrated that the MagNet defense can be easily compromised
if the attacker is aware that the defense is applied [4] .

The adaptive noise reduction defense also uses a concept that has been explored in this
work [23]. The adaptive noise reduction defense applies filters to the images and compares
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the classification of the unfiltered image to the classification of the filtered image. If the
two classifications do not match, then the sample is rejected as adversarial. Adaptive noise
reduction shows strong performance on samples attacked with small perturbations, but the
defense is weak against larger perturbations.

4.1.1 Training Autoencoders
As stated in chapter 3, MagNet requires a trained denoising autoencoder. The
amount of noise used in training the autoencoder is an important parameter as too much
noise added will result in a fuzzy output making it difficult for the classifier to generalize.
If this occurs the accuracy on the auto-encoded test set will be significantly lower than the
accuracy on the unmodified test set. A different problem occurs if very little noise is added:
in this case the autoencoder will learn weights that result in a near perfect duplicate of the
original image. If the autoencoder learns a 1 to 1 mapping of the input, it is not changing
the image at all, and is not contributing to the overall defense performance. There exists
a Goldilocks zone – so to speak – where the performance on the test data is not dramatically decreased, while the autoencoder is modifying the image enough to detect adversarial
samples with the Jensen-Shannon Divergence and reconstruction detectors.

4.1.2 Setting Thresholds
Both detectors in MagNet relies on a threshold. The threshold determines the tradeoff between false positives (improperly detecting a real sample as adversarial) and false
negatives (missing an adversarial sample). The threshold, defined as β, is the percentage
of the training set that is acceptable as false positives. A β of 0.0 sets the thresholds to the
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largest value such that no training samples will be detected as adversarial. A low β sets
the thresholds to result in small amount of false positives, but may not be as sensitive to
capturing adversarial data. As β is increased, the sensitivity of the defense is also increased
at the cost of a lower specificity. Another important note is that the β is defined per detector
so a β of 0.01 will detect 1% of the training data with the reconstruction error detector and
will detected 1% of the data with the JSD detector. In other words, although each detector
detects 1% of the training data, the total false positives can range between 1% to 2% – 1%
if all samples are detected by both detectors and they are the same, or 2%, if the samples
detected by the two detectors are all different, and between 1% and 2% if in case of a
mixture of the two. It is also vital to evaluate the false positive rate of the defense at test
time as quantifying the false positive rate is an important aspect when considering applying
a defense. An example of finding the reconstruction error threshold is shown in Algorithm
7.
Algorithm 7 Selecting threshold with β
x original sample
AE autoencoder
β percentage of training data acceptable as false positives
Input: β, AE, x
1: for x in trainingset do
2:
x̂ = AE(x)
p
3:
distances.append( x̂ − x)2 )
4:
5:
6:

sort distances
# Select the threshold so β percent of the samples are detected
reconthresh = distances[round(len(distances) ∗ (1 − β))]

Assuming X is the set of training examples, Equation 4.1 shows how the JSD
threshold can be found.
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∀x ∈ X : D = JSD(Z(x)||Z(x̂) sort D and JSDthresh = D[1−β]

(4.1)

4.1.3 Reconstruction Error Based Detectors
The reconstruction error detectors aim to detect samples that have abnormally high
reconstruction errors. More specifically, a sample x is passed through an autoencoder yielding x̂. If the LP norm between x and x̂ is greater than a user-defined threshold, then the
sample is deemed adversarial and removed from the data-stream. This threshold is established by applying a specified false positive threshold β to the training set. The reconstruction error threshold is selected based on the β value following practices explained above.

The autoencoders are trained so all genuine samples result in the smallest reconstruction
error possible. A non-adversarial sample x passed through the autoencoder yields the modified sample x̂. The reconstruction error is computed from |x̂ − x|P and is expected to
be less than or equal to the threshold as the sample is not adversarial. When an adversarial sample x0 passes through the autoencoder, however, the reconstructed image x̂0 should
modify x0 so that x̂0 lies closer than x0 to the correct classes classification boundary. The
reconstruction error on x0 should ideally result in a detection. Controlling the false positive
rate controls how many samples are detected, which allows for detection of more adversarial examples at the expense of detecting more real samples as false positives.
Figure 15 demonstrates the reconstruction error detector. In this figure, the red X refers to
an original sample, the blue X̂ refers to the auto-encoded sample and the arrow is the re-
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construction error of the sample. The upper left of the figure shows the samples that belong
to class 3, the reconstruction error of these samples are small therefore they are not detected
as adversarial. In the top right, an adversarial sample (a modified ”3”) can be seen as it is
across the decision boundary and far away from the cluster of data points that belong to
class 3. The adversarial sample in the top right is passed through the autoencoder resulting
in the X̂ seen closer the boundary. The arrow pointing from the original sample to the autoencoded sample is much larger than that of the true data points. This large reconstruction
error would result in the detection of this sample.

Figure 15
Demonstration of Reconstruction Error Detector
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4.1.4 JSD Detector
The Jensen-Shannon Divergence (JSD) detector is also used in MagNet. The JSD
detector attempts to analyze the outputs of f (x) and f (x̂): if the divergence between them
is greater than some threshold, the sample is removed as adversarial. The output of f (x)
is equal to the softmax of the logits, or the values contained in the last layer of the neural
network classifier. Softmax is defined in equation 4.2 where li refers to the ith element of
the output vector. As the JSD detector requires softmax outputs, this detector is limited
to neural networks and classifiers that can provide such probabilistic outputs. The JSD
detector looks for a significant difference between the distributions of outputs. This detector
works well for detecting an adversarial sample that has dramatically different output values
on f (x) and f (x̂). For example, if an image of 7 is perturbed and classified as a 9 with high
confidence, but after passing the sample through the autoencoder it is classified as a 9 with
much lower confidence, the sample would be flagged by the JSD detector. Adversarial
examples seek to modify the classification of a target sample, while achieving this goal
of modifying the classification the outputs of the classifier must be modified. The JSD
detector works to analyze the outputs of the classifier checking the difference between
f (x) and f (x̂) values against the threshold and detecting the sample if the difference is
above the threshold.
exp(li )
softmax(li ) = Pn
j=1 exp(lj )

(4.2)

Equation 4.3 shows the Jensen-Shannon Divergence between two distributions P
and Q, where D is the KL divergence. The number resulting from this calculation quantifies the difference between the distributions. A smaller JSD implies that the distributions
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are close together and a larger JSD implies a larger difference between (dissimilar) distributions. The JSD detector relies heavily on the threshold selected, which is selected following
the same methodology explained above.
1
1
JSD(P ||Q) = D(P ||M ) + D(Q||M )
2
2

(4.3)

1
M = (P + Q)
2

(4.4)

As Meng et al. have found, the softmax often saturates towards the highest probability
class, which heavily skews the distribution of the outputs [28]. To prevent the saturating
of the softmax outputs, a temperature variable, T , is added to the softmax, which softens
the probabilities and reduces over saturation to the most likely class. This modification is
applied to the softmax and is shown in equation 4.5.
exp(li /T )
softmax(li ) = Pn
j=1 exp(lj /T )
4.2

(4.5)

Proposed Defense: Broad Spectrum Defense (BSD)
The proposed defense does not rely on any existing attacks to define the region

in which the adversarial samples may reside. Instead we attempt to bound the region in
which genuine data reside, any data found outside of the bounded genuine data would
then be considered adversarial data. The proposed defense is constructed by combining
different detectors to attempt to cover as much of the adversarial space as possible, while
also minimizing the amount of overlap with the distribution of genuine data. The broad
spectrum defense builds off of the MagNets’ detectors described above.
We refer to our proposed approach as broad spectrum defense (BSD), which uses an
autoencoder to measure the error between the genuine input sample x and its reconstructed
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output x̂. For genuine data, such an error should be small. A large error, i.e., a large distance
between a sample and its reconstructed image (based on training with genuine data) is an
indication of an adversarial sample. Hence, such samples with high reconstruction errors
are deemed adversarial and removed from the data stream. Such a reconstruction error
detector should ideally remove all adversarial examples that yield high reconstruction error
when passed through the autoencoder. We retain the use the Jensen-Shannon divergence
(JSD) detector from MagNet as well. As explained above, the JSD detector evaluates the
difference between the softmax outputs of the neural network f (x) and f (x̂). If the JSD
between the two is above a threshold determined from the training data, the sample is
deemed adversarial and rejected. As done in MagNet, the JSD detector is applied with two
different temperature values, 10 and 40. The softmax values of f (x) and f (x̂) are divided
by each temperature and a detector is built for each. The temperature values are utilized
to help avoid the saturation that occurs near high and low values of the softmax function.
We note that these samples are removed in a way that only relies on the true distribution of
genuine data points used to train the autoencoder, and hence no existing attacks are used in
the training of the BSD. In other words, BSD does not require or rely on the availability of
any adversarial data to be used for training.

4.2.1 Class Divergence Detector (Unique to BSD)
The Class Divergence Detector (CDD) is a new detector we add to enhance MagNet
and provide additional coverage against a broader spectrum of adversarial attacks. As expected, additional coverage comes at the expense of a higher false positive rate. In chapter
5 we demonstrate this trade off. To further restrict the adversary’s attack space, we add
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an additional detector to MagNet, the Class Divergence Detector (CDD). To explain the
CDD we must first review some terminology. During inference time, the classifier - when
presented with the input x - produces the label y. The classifier is then presented with x̂,
or the auto-encoded representation of the sample, resulting in ŷ. The idea of this detector
is that by transforming the sample with the autoencoder, the classification of this new data
x̂ would result in the same classification if the sample is not malicious, or would result
in a different classification for adversarial examples. A true sample and its auto-encoded
variant are expected to be very close in distance and therefore result in the same classification. An adversarial sample carefully manipulates the data to change the classification,
but remain close to the decision boundary. Passing this adversarial sample through the autoencoder may result in a change in classification and this will result in a detection. The
CDD does not have any hyperparameters to tune, and is only a function of the classifier
and the auto-encoded sample. In the case of a benign sample, the classification from the
original sample will equal the classification of the auto-encoded sample, y == ŷ, and the
sample will not be detected. In the case of an adversarial sample, the classification from
the original sample will not equal the classification of the auto-encoded sample, y 6= ŷ,
and the sample will be detected. Figure 16 demonstrates how the class divergence detector
functions. The red X marks the location of the adversarial example. In this case it will be
classified as a “9” as the adversary has forced the sample to be misclassified by adding the
extra white pixels. After the sample is passed through the autoencoder, it now resides at
the blue x̂, note that now it is on the side of the decision boundary which will be classified
as a “6”. The change in classification from the original sample to the auto-encoded sample
is what allows for the detection of the data. It is very possible that this sample could have
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bypassed MagNets reconstruction error detector (the distance auto-encoded sample is close
to the adversarial sample), and JSD detector (the output softmax values from f (x̂) could be
close to f (x)). For example, if the sample was classified as “9“ with similar probability to
“6“, then passing it through the autoencoder yielded a classification of “6“, the CDD would
detect the sample as the class has changed, but the JSD may not detect it if the distributions
are highly similar. Through our experiments in Chapter 5 we show that the CDD does in
fact capture these samples missed by MagNets detectors.

Figure 16
Demonstration of Class Divergence Detector
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4.2.2 BSD Summary
For an adversarial sample to defeat BSD, the adversarial sample must be bound in
reconstruction error, must satisfy y == ŷ (the classification of the test sample must match
the classification of the auto-encoded sample), and still maintain the JSD between f (x) and
f (x̂) that is below the thresholds established on the training dataset. The resulting defense
is therefore able to detect adversarial examples with very small perturbations, all the way
up to examples with large perturbations. Hence the proposed BSD is designed to detect a
wide array of adversaries, while also minimizing false positives.
Figure 17 shows a block diagram of the broad spectrum defense. At inference time,
the sample x is passed through the autoencoder yielding the auto-encoded sample x̂. The
sample and its auto-encoded variant are then passed through the model yielding two sets
of logits and predictions. Using the logits, predictions, and auto-encoded sample, the test
point can be evaluated against the reconstruction error, Jensen-Shannon divergence, class
divergence detectors and, if the sample is not flagged as adversarial, its classification ŷ is
returned.
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Figure 17
Broad Spectrum Defense Block Diagram
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Algorithm 8 Broad Spectrum Defense
x original sample
AE autoencoder
Z classifier Logit Values (Pre softmax)
f classifier
β percentage of training data acceptable as false positives
Input: x, AE, Z, f, β
1: Establish Trecon and TJSD from training set using β
2: x̂ = AE(x)
3: y = f (x)
4: ŷ = f (x̂) p
(x − x̂)2
5: Erecon =
6: EJSD = |JSD[Z(x)] − JSD[Z(x̂)]|
7: if y == ŷ & Erecon < Trecon & EJSD < TJSD then
8:
Return classification y for sample x
9: else
10:
Sample is detected as adversarial
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Chapter 5
Experiments, Results and Comprehensive Analysis of BSD
5.1

Metrics Used to Evaluate Robustness
It is difficult to evaluate the robustness of a detector-based defense as it is difficult

to make any theoretical robustness claims given we are not able to map the entire adversarial attack surface. In some works, the authors discuss robustness with respect to some
 ball of a given data point. For example, Ghiasi et al. [13] demonstrate that robustness
within an  ball results in classifiers vulnerable to larger, non-LP norm attacks, such as
the Shadow attack and Spatial attack. We take a more holistic and empirical approach to
evaluate robustness by generating a variety of attacks using different distance metrics and
methodologies. Evaluating the proposed defense against a wide variety of existing attacks
paints a picture of the utility of this defense. The proposed broad spectrum defense (BSD)
does not utilize any information from existing attacks, therefore BSD is not biased towards
any attack style, allowing better generalization to other future attacks. The accuracy on adversarial data is reported as the adversarial accuracy, the rate at which adversarial samples
are detected or classified correctly, as shown in Equation 5.1. In Equation 5.1 D refers to
the set of adversarial examples detected by the defense. This equation computes the success
rate of the defense, recall that a detector defense succeeds by detecting and identifying the
adversarial sample as adversarial. Also recall that MagNet, BSD, and Feature Squeezing
pass the samples through filters and/or autoencoders and then classify these samples. If a
sample passes the detector (i.e., not deemed or caught as adversarial), it passes through the
filters and then the model for a final classification. This process gives the defense an opportunity to filter / rectify a potential adversarial sample that happened to pass the detector, so
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that its final classification is in fact correct. If the defense is able to rectify the adversarial
example resulting in a correct classification, the defense has succeeded on that sample. The
adversarial accuracy metric quantifies the success rate of remedying (detecting or correctly
classifying) an adversarial sample.
PN
Accadv =

i=1

yi = argmax[f (xi )] or xi ∈ D
N

(5.1)

5.1.1 True / False Positive Trade Off
When evaluating the performance of a detector, the false positive rate is an important consideration. A false positive occurs when a non-adversarial sample is detected (and
hence declared) as adversarial. An optimal defense would have a zero false positive rate
while detecting all of the adversarial samples (also known as true positives). In reality, a
trade off exists in which a zero false positive rate would result in missed adversarial samples (also known as missed detection (false negative)). On the other hand, a 100% success
rate at detecting adversaries (i.e., zero missed detection) would result in a non-zero false
positive detection rate. In this work, the trade off is controlled by the parameter β. The
β parameter controls the user’s threshold for false positives, i.e., how much of the data is
acceptable as false positive detections. This parameter has a valid range of 0 to 1: with
β = 0, the detectors are selected as to not detect any of the data in the training set (as
adversarial). With β = 0.01, the thresholds are established such that 1% of the data in the
training set are flagged as adversarial for each detector.
In this work we compute measures of sensitivity and specificity using separate adversarial and non adversarial data. More specifically, we evaluated BSD in two distinct
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environments to quantify performance. First we evaluate the defense in an environment
that consists of only adversarial (positive) test examples. In this case we find the sensitivity, the true positives (detected as adversarial or classified correctly) divided by the number
of all test samples (all of which are adversarial) 5.2. The sensitivity reveals how well the
defense is able to identify adversarial samples. As described earlier, Equation 5.1 or the
adversarial accuracy is a measure of sensitivity as it is measuring the rate at which the
defense succeeds on positive samples.
Sensitivity =

TP
TP + FN

(5.2)

We then evaluate the defense in an environment consisting of only benign (clean) samples.
In this case our experiments reflect the specificity or the rate at which benign images are
correctly identified as benign.
Specif icity =

TN
TN + FP

(5.3)

To demonstrate how many false positives are detected, each defense is evaluated
against the benign test set. On such a benign (clean) test set, any detection (i.e., any instance flagged as adversarial) is considered as a misclassification - a false positive. Benign
accuracy is computed as the ratio of all correctly classified samples that were not detected
(as adversarial) to the total number of samples, as demonstrated in equation 5.4. Ideally,
the set of detected samples would be empty on the test set (zero false positives). Equation
5.4 captures the performance loss incurred by incorrectly detecting test samples. Note,
Equation 5.4 reflects the sensitivity of the defense, or its ability to correctly identify benign
samples without flagging them.
PN
[yi = argmax[f (xi )] and xi 6∈ D]
Accbenign = i=1
N
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(5.4)

5.2

Datasets Used
Various datasets were utilized to evaluate the performance of BSD. The datasets

vary in resolution of images, number of channels, number of classes, and number of images
per class. Sample images from each dataset are shown below.

5.2.1 MNIST
The MNIST dataset contains hand written digits 0 to 9, leading to a 10-class classification problem. The MNIST dataset contains 70,000 gray scale 28x28 images, examples
are shown in Figure 18. This dataset is split into two subsets: 60,000 images for training
and 10,000 images for testing. [21] The MNIST dataset has been used for years to benchmark the performance of simple image classifiers [20], and achieving above 99% testing
accuracy on MNIST is possible. MNIST is also widely used in adversarial machine learning as adversarial samples can be generated and visualized rapidly with low computational
overhead. Many works have focused on attempting to secure a MNIST classifier against all
adversarial samples, but none have succeeded yet [36].
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Figure 18
MNIST Dataset

5.2.2 CIFAR10
CIFAR10 dataset contains 32x32 color images of 10 objects: airplane, automobile,
bird, cat, deer, dog, frog, horse, ship, and truck [19]. Examples of CIFAR10 images are
shown in Figure 19. This data set consists of 50,000 training images and 10,000 test images, that breaks down to 5000 training images per class and 1000 test images per class.
Compared to MNIST, CIFAR10 is a color dataset with 3 channels, and CIFAR10 increases
the resolution to 32x32 from 28x28. This dataset offers an incremental increase in complexity from MNIST without taking too large of a step.
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Figure 19
CIFAR10 Dataset

5.2.3 CIFAR100
CIFAR100 is very similar to CIFAR10 as it contains 32x32 color images of 100
classes, representative examples are shown in Figure 20. The dataset still consists of 50,000
training images and 10,000 testing images making it a more difficult task than CIFAR10.
In CIFAR100 there are 500 training images per class and 100 test images per class. [19]

Figure 20
CIFAR100 Dataset
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5.2.4 TinyImageNet
The TinyImageNet dataset consists of 200 classes with 500 training images each
(100,000 total) and 50 test images per class (10,000 total). These images are 64x64 resolution downsampled from the original 256x256 images. A sampling of TinyImageNet
are shown in Figure 21. The TinyImageNet problem doubles the number of classes from
CIFAR100, and also doubles the resolution of the images, resulting in a more challenging
classification problem that requires modern neural network architectures to achieve acceptable results. [35]

Figure 21
TinyImageNet Dataset

5.2.5 ImageNet
ImageNet is one of the largest publicly available datasets with 1,261,406 training
images (668 to 3047 per class) and 50,000 images provided for testing (50 per class). The
images contained in ImageNet come from 1000 different classes and have a resolution of
256x256. Some representative examples of ImageNet are shown in Figure 22. In this work,
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we used the Large Scale Visual Recognition Challenge 2012 version of the dataset. The
feature space of ImageNet is considerably larger than TinyImageNet as it has five times the
number of classes and four times the resolution. ImageNet is used to demonstrate how well
classifiers, attacks, and defense can scale towards real life problems. [35]

Figure 22
ImageNet Dataset

5.3

Description of Experiments

5.3.1 Defenses for Comparisons
Feature Squeezing and MagNet are used to compare and contrast the performance
of the broad spectrum defense to existing defenses. MagNet was chosen in part because it
is a strong defense, and in part is a subset of the BSD, whereas Feature Squeezing was selected because it has been shown to be one of the best performing detector-based defenses.
Another reason why we selected these two defenses is because they are not trained with
adversarial data. This attribute is critical and necessary to create a generalizable defense.
In the paper describing Feature Squeezing, the authors performed a direct comparison and
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found that MagNet significantly outperformed Feature Squeezing on MNIST, and Feature
Squeezing outperformed MagNet on CIFAR-10, indicating a lack of clear winner between
the two [40]. Other defense approaches were excluded for reasons such as training with
adversarial data, only functioning on specific datasets, or only effective on a small subset
of adversarial attacks. Table 2 in Chapter 3 has shown that MagNet, Feature Squeezing and
BSD are the only defenses that meet this criteria.
In forming the comparison, MagNet and BSD are both controlled by the same β
parameter allowing for a one-to-one comparison. As the FS defense is created without the
β parameter, we omit this defense from the benign accuracy evaluation. The benign accuracy evaluation was performed to allow for a comparison between MagNet and BSD, this
comparison shows how much additional error is introduced by using the Class Divergence
Detector. For the Feature Squeezing defense, we defer to the author provided parameters
for each dataset presented in their work. We provide an adversarial performance comparison between FS, MagNet, and BSD.

5.3.2 Adversarial Evaluation
The adversarial robustness for Feature Squeezing, MagNet, and BSD is determined
by evaluating each against a variety of attacks. Each attack was crafted using the same
dataset used to train the same classifier, with the same attack data passed to each defense.
To show how well each defense generalizes, attacks of different norms (L0 , L2 , L∞ ) were
utilized. In addition to the traditional LP norm attacks, another set of attacks, that do
not utilize the Lp norm (shadow and spatial attacks), were also used. All defenses and
attacks were evaluated on MNIST, CIFAR10, CIFAR100, TinyImageNet, and ImageNet
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datasets. BSD and MagNet were applied with a β value of 0.05, this β value was selected
to match the expected False Positive rate given in the Feature Squeezing paper [40]. The
aforementioned experiments provides a comprehensive comparison of defenses across a
wide spectrum of attacks and environments.

5.3.3 Autoencoder Comparison
MagNet and BSD are constructed using a denoising autoencoder. The denoising
autoencoder is one of two hyper parameters that determine the defenses performance (the
other being β). We evaluate BSD with 5 different autoencoder architectures to demonstrate
the impact of different autoencoder architectures on adversarial and benign performance.
The comaprison is shown in Section 5.9.

5.4

MNIST

5.4.1 Experimental Setup
On the MNIST dataset high classification accuracies can be achieved using relatively simple convolutional neural network architectures. In these experiments, we used
a convolutional neural network with parameters specified in Table 3. In Table 3, the first
column specifies the layer type and the second column shows the layer parameters, such as
number of filters, number of nodes, or kernel size. We chose this specific network, because
it was used in prior works and serves as a benchmark classifier [34] [28].
The MNIST dataset was normalized to zero mean with -1 to 1 bounds. The bounds were
selected to line up with the output of the autoencoder: the activation function used on the
final layer of the autoencoder was the hyperbolic tangent (tanh) function, whose range is
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also bounded between -1 to 1.

Table 3
MNIST Classifier Architecture
Layer Type
Relu Convolution
Relu Convolution
Max Pooling
Relu Convolution
Relu Convolution
Max Pooling
Relu Fully Connect.
Relu Fully Connect.
Softmax

Layer Parameters
32 filters (3x3)
32 filters (3x3)
2x2
64 filters (3x3)
64 filters (3x3)
2x2
200 units
200 units
10 units

5.4.2 Benign Accuracy Evaluation
The benign accuracy for MNIST is shown in Figure 23. The blue line (BSD) and
pink line (MagNet) show the benign accuracy of each defense on the unmodified test set
of the MNIST dataset. We are able to form a one to one comparison between MagNet
and BSDs’ benign accuracy as they are both controlled by the same parameter β. Figure
23 shows that as the β value is increased towards 0.05, the accuracy drops from 100%
to 95%, an expected behavior. The “No Defense Accuracy” shown in Figure 23 refers
to the accuracy of the classifier operating on the same (non-adversarial) test set as the
MagNet and BSD defenses. Note that the accuracy of the classifier on the test data, or the
“No Defense Accuracy“ is independent of the β value and serves as a baseline (zero false
positive detections). Increasing β increases the quantity of false positives in the test set, so
we would expect a drop in performance on the clean test data as β is increased. On MNIST,
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both defenses have an identical false positive rate at each β value (as shown by overlapping
blue and pink lines), indicating that the Class Divergence Detector has not increased the
number of false positive detections on MNIST.

Figure 23
Impact of Detectors on MNIST

5.4.3 Performance on All Attacks
Table 4 shows the adversarial accuracy (Equation 5.1) of BSD, MagNet, and FS
against a variety of attacks. It is important to note that the attacks used include a variety
of L0 , L2 , L∞ , and non-Lp norm based attacks. The attacks were all white box attacks,
the strongest – if unrealistic – attacks possible, generated with complete knowledge of the
classifier, parameters, and data. The attacks were not aware, however, of any defenses
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potentially applied. A defense that is truly robust should offer protection against any adversarial attack regardless of the distance metric or formulation. The table shows that in
all cases, BSD outperforms MagNet and FS on this dataset. It is important to note that
Figure 23 has shown that BSD can be applied without introducing additional false positive
detections over MagNet, and applying BSD can slightly improve adversarial accuracy over
the wide variety of attacks shown in Table 4.

Table 4
MNIST Adversarial Accuracy at β = 0.05

5.5

Attack Type
FGSM
JSMA
PGD
DeepFool

BSD
99.45 %
94.45 %
100.00%
99.44 %

MagNet
98.79 %
94.42 %
100.00%
99.42 %

FS
93.74 %
76.98 %
91.45%
76.98%

No Defense
9.93 %
9.70 %
14.45%
0.00 %

Carlini Wagner

91.38%

91.33%

89.48%

9.8%

EAD
Spatial

96.56%
86.16 %

95.26%
85.68 %

96.02%
76.41 %

0.00 %
0.00 %

Shadow

99.32 %

99.22 %

97.95 %

8.79 %

CIFAR10

5.5.1 Experimental Setup
To evaluate the performance of BSD on a more complex dataset, the results on the
CIFAR10 data set were analyzed. A classifier trained to 81.7% accuracy (under no attack)
was used to evaluate the defense. Table 5 shows the architecture of a simple convolutional
neural network. This CNN architecture we used is identical to the one used in defensive
distillation and related works. [34] [28]. In Table 5, the first column refers to the layer type,
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the second column shows the layer parameters such as number of filters, number of nodes,
or kernel size.
To mimic the work done in On the Limitations of MagNet Defense Against L-1 Based
Adversarial Examples, the autoencoder contains 3 layers, the first two are kernel size of
3x3 with 256 filters, the last layer is kernel size of 3x3 with 3 filters [26]. The CIFAR10
data was normalized to zero mean with -1 to 1 bounds.

Table 5
CIFAR10 Standard Classifier Architecture
Layer Type
Relu Convolution
Relu Convolution
Max Pooling

Layer Parameters
64 filters (3x3)
64 filters (3x3)
2x2

Relu Convolution
Relu Convolution
Max Pooling

128 filters (3x3)
128 filters (3x3)
2x2

Relu Fully Connect.

256 units

Relu Fully Connect.

256 units

Softmax

10 units

5.5.2 Benign Accuracy Evaluation
The benign accuracy (Equation 5.4) of the defense on the non-adversarial test set is
evaluated to determine the quantity of false positives. A sweep is performed over β values
to demonstrate the change in benign accuracy on the test set as the β parameter is increased.
Figure 24 shows that with a β of 0, 76% accuracy is achieved with MagNet and 73% is
achieved with BSD. The figure also shows that the No Defense Accuracy, or the accuracy of
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the classifier on the benign test set with no defense applied, is 81%. The result is expected
as MagNet and BSD follow the same slope meaning that the β dependent components
are detecting the same samples. The β dependent components are the reconstruction error
based detector and the JSD detector. The constant difference between MagNet and BSD as seen in Figure 24 – is attributed to the Class Divergence Detector. As BSD includes an
additional detector, it will detect more clean samples as false positives than MagNet, but
– as we will see below – the extra detector will also catch more adversarial samples than
MagNet. As the threshold is increased, the accuracy on the test set declines linearly – as
expected – similar to the results observed on the MNIST set.

Figure 24
Impact of Detectors on CIFAR10
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5.5.3 Performance on Wide Spectrum of Attacks
Different adversarial attacks were performed against the neural network used for
classification, some of these attacks are fundamentally different in how they construct adversarial examples. Table 6 shows that in most cases BSD offers a gain in accuracy over
other defenses - often with wide margins. This gain is most pronounced in the spatial and
shadow attacks. This result is expected as the spatial and shadow attacks do not optimize
using a LP norm, instead they utilize different similarity metrics to ensure the adversarial
images look like the original images. The table demonstrates that BSD offers an 32% gain
on the shadow attack over Feature Squeezing and an 23% gain over MagNet. Since the
primary difference between MagNet and BSD is the class divergence detector (CDD), the
23% performance gain can be attributed to the CDD. Another interesting take away from
the table is that MagNet and BSD both achieve 99.90% adversarial accuracy on PGD while
FS only achieves a 1.02%. Table 6 also shows that Elastic Net and Spatial attacks were unable to develop strong attacks as the accuracy of the classifier without a defense is as high
as 82.62% and 84.47 %. In both of these cases, applying BSD still leads to an increase in
performance as some of the adversarial samples successfully crafted are detected.
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Table 6
CIFAR10 Adversarial Performance at β = 0.05

5.6

Attack Type
FGSM
JSMA
PGD
DeepFool

BSD
43.85 %
97.36 %
99.90%
86.43%

MagNet
31.84 %
69.33 %
99.90%
73.34%

FS
38.87 %
62.99 %
1.02%
39.89%

No Defense
18.75 %
2.15 %
23.53%
8.1%

Carlini Wagner

81.84 %

73.44 %

73.44 %

0.00 %

Elastic Net
Spatial

90.63 %
91.11 %

77.34 %
79.30 %

77.54 %
83.11 %

82.62 %
84.47 %

Shadow

77.15 %

53.61 %

44.92 %

45.51 %

CIFAR100
CIFAR100 is a significant increase in difficulty over CIFAR10 due to increase in

number of classes from 10 to 100. As a result, a simple neural network can only yield
results in the 20-30% range. Therefore, we used a Wide Res-Net, which achieved a 79%
accuracy with benign test data. The same preprocessing steps are also repeated, the data
was normalized to zero mean with -1 to 1 bounds.

5.6.1 Benign Accuracy Evaluation
As shown in Figure 25, BSD – which adds the class divergence detector to MagNet
– results in a slight benign accuracy (Equation 5.4) decrease of 2.4% compared to MagNet.
As β is increased, we see the expected linear downtrend of benign accuracy of MagNet
and BSD. The figure shows that applying MagNet at a β of 0 results in a 5% decrease in
accuracy from the baseline. It is important to note that it took two attempts to generate
the results shown in Figure 5.4. The first run of this experiment was done with the same
autoencoder trained on CIFAR10 retrained for CIFAR100. The autoencoder was not able
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to reconstruct the samples well and resulted in a 40% decrease to benign performance. To
remedy the poor autoencoder selection, a deeper autoencoder was trained and applied to
BSD resulting in the 7% drop shown in the figure (the difference between black and blue
lines).

Figure 25
Accuracy on Clean Data for CIFAR100
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5.6.2 Evaluation on Adversarial Data
A variety of attacks were launched against the CIFAR-100 dataset. Table 7 demonstrates that on the CIFAR100 dataset, BSD out performed MagNet and Feature Squeezing
on every attack. In the case of FGSM and PGD, MagNet and BSD both achieved 100% adversarial accuracy. BSD demonstrates very high performance gains of over 12% on DeepFool. BSD provides strong coverage over the CIFAR100 dataset outperforming MagNet
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and resulting in between 72 and 100% adversarial accuracy across all attacks.

Table 7
CIFAR100 Adversarial Performance at β = 0.05

5.7

Attack Type
FGSM
JSMA
PGD
DeepFool

BSD
100 %
98.83 %
100%
78.32%

MagNet
100 %
89.55 %
100%
66.80%

FS
18.4 %
19.05 %
8.67%
35.04%

No Defense
2.34 %
0.01 %
2.92%
18.65%

Carlini Wagner

72.17 %

68.26 %

31.95 %

0.00 %

EAD
Spatial

96.06%
83.89 %

87.99
78.42 %

16.06%
13.91 %

4.79%
13.91 %

Shadow

100 %

99.80 %

3.00 %

3.00 %

TinyImageNet
On TinyImageNet dataset, the Feature Squeezing defense was found to only detect

between 5 and 15% of adversarial examples for any given attack. We have utilized the
authors’ implementation of Feature Squeezing and used the same hyperparameters the authors have selected for the TinyImageNet dataset. We believe the low performance of FS
comes from the fact that we have selected to evaluate the defenses on a ResNet18 network
consisting of 11.6 million parameters. The authors’ of Feature Squeezing used a MobileNet
architecture made up of only 5 million parameters. The FS defense relies on applying filters
to images and examining the classifications, a very tightly fit model (like ResNet18) will
have decision boundaries drawn closer to the samples than a model with a looser fit. Due
to the tight fit of the ResNet, we believe that the changes introduced by the filters of FS are
not able to push the adversarial samples across the decision boundary towards the correct
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class. This inability to change the classification of samples by applying filters results in the
low 5% to 15% performance found on TinyImageNet.

5.7.1 Benign Accuracy Evaluation
A larger autoencoder is needed on this dataset since the feature space is considerably larger compared to other datasets, and a more complex network is therefore required to
learn the underlying data distributions. Figure 26 demonstrates that BSD and MagNet can
be applied to TinyImageNet with minimal impact on the clean data performance. Note how
with a β of zero MagNet results in 1% loss in benign accuracy and BSD introduces a 2%
loss in benign accuracy (the additional 1% is attributed to the Class Divergence Detector).

Figure 26
Accuracy on Clean Data for TinyImageNet
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5.7.2 Evaluation on Adversarial Data
To evaluate the TinyImageNet dataset on adversarial images we followed the same
procedure used on the other datasets. We performed the same set of attacks over the test set
of TinyImageNet and evaluated the adversarial accuracy of BSD, MagNet, and FS defenses
to compare them and highlight the differences in performance. This comparison is shown
in Table 8. As described earlier, the results for Feature Squeezing are between 5 and 15%
against every attack. It appears that for larger datasets, Feature Squeezing may need to
be tweaked to the specific model used for classification to achieve the best performance.
This is important to note as the goal of BSD is to design a defense that can be applied to
any model and any dataset without requiring the tuning of parameters. Table 8 shows that
in most of the attacks on TinyImageNet, MagNet is very close in adversarial accuracy or
ties the accuracy of BSD. In EAD and Spatial Attack the difference is more pronounced as
BSD achieves a 5.47% and 7.71% increase in adversarial accuracy.

Table 8
TinyImageNet Adversarial Performance at β = 0.05
Attack Type
FGSM
JSMA
PGD
DeepFool

BSD
100.00 %
99.41 %
100.00%
67.68 %

MagNet
100.00 %
97.85 %
100.00%
63.37 %

FS
9.75%
14.26%
4.35%
6.98%

No Defense
0.20 %
0.29 %
2.54%
0.00 %

Carlini Wagner

66.68 %

61.94 %

5.09%

0.25 %

EAD
Spatial Attack

73.24%
48.24 %

67.77%
40.53 %

5.7 %
5.92 %

58.59%
11.52 %

Shadow Attack

86.81 %

83.69 %

4.59%

21.48 %
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5.8

ImageNet
The ImageNet dataset consists of very large 256x256 images. This dataset is used

to test the upper bound of BSD and see if it can continue to defense against adversarial
attacks in such a vast feature space. On the ImageNet dataset, the Feature Squeezing behavior mimicked the results on TinyImageNet data as Feature Squeezing was only able to
detect between 5% and 13% of adversarial examples on any given attack. Once again, this
could be attributed to the fact that we used the authors selected hyper-parameters instead
of attempting to tune the hyper parameters to the ResNet18 model used for classification.
Once again, this is an interesting result as the goal of BSD is to design a defense capable of
generalizing to any dataset and defending any model without adjusting hyper-parameters.

5.8.1 Benign Accuracy Evaluation
On ImageNet, we train a large autoencoder to learn to denoise the samples. Figure 27 shows that on ImageNet the classifier achieves a 69.81% accuracy on the clean test
dataset. At a β value of zero, BSD achieves a benign accuracy of 66.57% and MagNet
results in a benign accuracy of 68.41%. As the β parameter is increased, the benign accuracy quickly decreases. This decrease is attributed to the false detections by both the JSD
and the reconstruction error detector. These false detections are not coming from the CDD
as the CDD is independent of the β. Futhermore, the CDD can be seen by measuring the
constant difference between MagNet and BSD, in this case the CDD results in a 1.84%
decrease in benign accuracy from MagNet.
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Figure 27
Accuracy on Clean Data for ImageNet
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5.8.2 Evaluation on Adversarial Data
Imagenet is a very large dataset with a vast feature space, for this reason certain
attacks become infeasible to compute. One example is the JSMA attack, which requires
the creation of a matrix of forward derivatives for each input pixel, a process that requires
more than 12 gigabytes memory (the capacity of the Titan V GPU used to generate attacks),
therefor JSMA was not computed on ImageNet. Table 9 shows that in all cases BSD out
performs both MagNet and Feature Squeezing. In a few cases, the difference in adversarial
accuracy between BSD and MagNet is more pronounced. Two of these cases are the Spatial
and Shadow attacks where BSD outperforms MagNet by 7.82% and 8.6%. It appears that
over all data sets, BSD provides the most performance gain on these non-LP norm attacks.
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Table 9
ImageNet Adversarial Performance at β = 0.05

5.9

Attack Type
FGSM
JSMA
PGD
DeepFool

BSD
98.20 %
N/A
82.03%
86.32%

MagNet
97.76 %
N/A
80.27%
81.84%

FS
1.10%
N/A
2.9%
6.14%

No Defense
0.14 %
N/A
28.32%
78.51 %

Carlini Wagner

83.98 %

80.46 %

7.67 %

43.36%

EAD
Spatial Attack

96.48%
63.28 %

91.41 %
55.46 %

12.15 %
8.22 %

4.68%
38.87 %

Shadow

59.38%

50.78 %

4.29%

38.86%

Autoencoder Selection Impact on Performance
In creating the broad spectrum defense, one must select a denoising autoencoder.

We have trained 5 autoencoders on CIFAR10, CIFAR100, and TinyImageNet to demonstrate how different datasets are impacted by the selection of the autoencoder. Table 10
shows the 5 autoencoder architectures used to perform this experiment. In the table the
first number represents the number of filters, for example in AutoencoderA there are 6 filters and the second number is the kernel size of the convolution that is 3 in each case. Each
pair of terms corresponds to one layer. The table shows the layers used in the encoder.
The autoencoder is symmetrical so the decoder is the reverse of the encoder, in the case of
AutoencoderB the decoder would have 2 convolutional layers, one with 12 filters and one
with 6 filters.
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Table 10
Autoencoders Used in Comparison
Autoencoder Name
AutoencoderA
AutoencoderB
AutoencoderC
AutoencoderD
AutoencoderE

Autoencoder Architecture
6x3
6x3 12x3
6x3 12x3 24x3
6x3 12x3 24x3 48x3
6x3 12x3 24x3 48x3 96x3

Evaluating the autoencoders involves measuring the benign performance and adversarial performance of BSD using each autoencoder. As we have already shown the benign
and adversarial performance in the prior subsections we will evaluate the autoencoders with
a static β value of 0.03 and evaluate the adversarial performance using the DeepFool attack.

5.9.1 CIFAR10
Table 11 shows that with each different autoencoder architecture, BSD results in
different adversarial and benign performance. The most important hyperparameter to select
in BSD is the autoencoder and in the case of CIFAR10, each autoencoder results in slightly
different benign performances. The adversarial performance increases with the depth of
the autoencoder, using the deepest autoencoder (AutoencoderE) one can achieve over an
11% performance in comparison to the most shallow autoencoder.
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Table 11
Autoencoders Used in Comparison CIFAR10
Autoencoder Name
AutoencoderA
AutoencoderB
AutoencoderC
AutoencoderD
AutoencoderE

Adversarial Performance (DeepFool)
77.34%
78.22%
84.08%
85.74%
88.38%

Benign Performance
73.09%
73.36%
72.62%
71.79%
72.05%

5.9.2 CIFAR100
Table 12 shows that CIFAR100 follows the same trend observed on CIFAR10.
Changing the autoencoder results in a deviation in benign performance. In the case of
CIFAR100, the deepest autoencoder result in a reduced benign performance (3% drop).
The adversarial evaluation results in the same trend found in CIFAR10 as well, as the autoencoder depth is increased the adversarial performance on the DeepFool attack increases.
On CIFAR100 the deepest autoencoder provides a 10% adversarial performance increase
over the shallowest.

Table 12
Autoencoders Used in Comparison CIFAR100
Autoencoder Name
AutoencoderA
AutoencoderB
AutoencoderC
AutoencoderD
AutoencoderE

Adversarial Performance (DeepFool)
74.51%
75.58%
76.95%
84.47%
85.78%
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Benign Performance
68.55%
68.94%
68.31%
65.98%
65.42%

5.9.3 TinyImageNet
Table 13 shows the performance of BSD on the 5 autoencoder architectures on
TinyImageNet. The benign performance behaves similarly to CIFAR10 and CIFAR100,
different architectures result in different benign performances but they are all within 3% of
each other. The adversarial performance also varied, but unlike CIFAR10 and CIFAR100
there was not a linear trend relating the increase in adversarial performance with the depth
of the autoencoder. The adversarial performance remained roughly the same with all tested
autoencoders on TinyImageNet.

Table 13
Autoencoders Used in Comparison TinyImageNet
Autoencoder Name
AutoencoderA
AutoencoderB
AutoencoderC
AutoencoderD
AutoencoderE

5.10

Adversarial Performance (DeepFool)
64.45%
62.40%
62.11%
65.04%
65.53%

Benign Performance
50.04%
51.28%
52.80%
52.02%
51.72%

Summarized Results Over Datasets
The results across all our experiments show that BSD does offer a significant im-

provement over MagNet and Feature Squeezing in all of the datasets shown, but this improvement comes at the cost of more false positive detections. The false positives occur
due to the additional CCD detector added to MagNet. This detector will at best, flag no
additional clean samples, but in reality few clean samples are detected as adversarial. The
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benefit of applying BSD over MagNet becomes more pronounced as the complexity of the
dataset is increased. For example, applying BSD to MNIST offers only slight improvement overall. Applying BSD to CIFAR10 results in a larger performance gain, and finally
applying BSD to TinyImageNet and ImageNet result in the largest performance gains over
MagNet and FS. These results show that the class divergence detector appears to scale with
complexity of datasets and models well. This result also makes sense as more complex
models are fit tightly, and a small disturbance can change the classification of the sample.
The class divergence detector was designed to solve this exact problem.

When looking at each defense by attack, it becomes apparent that BSD offers significant
accuracy gains on Shadow and Spatial attacks. This is promising as these attacks were designed using non-LP similarity metrics resulting in fundamentally unique attacks. BSD’s
ability to improve performance against Shadow and Spatial attacks demonstrate promise
that BSD may also provide some level of robustness against future yet to be developed
attacks.

We have also shown that by selecting a different autoencoder, performance on some datasets
may increase or decrease. CIFAR10 and CIFAR100 benefited from using a deeper autoencoder architecture. TinyImageNet performed similarly with each of the five tested autoencoders. When applying BSD one must carefully consider the selection of autoencoder architecture, by testing the defense with different autoencoder architectures one can discover
how the autoencoder depth impacts the benign and adversarial performance.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion and Future Work
6.1

Conclusion

6.1.1 Overview
The broad spectrum defense is designed to be a robust defense capable of generalizing across a wide variety of evasion attacks on any neural network and dataset. There are
a variety of evasion attacks constructed with different metrics, methods, and loss functions.
All of these attacks share the same goal: to generate a data point indistinguishable from
the original while forcing a misclassifciation from the network. Many defenses have been
developed in recent years, but a majority of these defenses focus on a subsection of the
problem such as defending against all L2 norm attacks, or defending against all LP norm
attacks. Some defenses utilize adversarial data in training, these methods are directly biased towards one type of attack: the one on which they are trained. These type of defenses
do not generalize well to other types of attacks that may be developed in the future. As
such, these defenses are considered to be reactive approaches as they were developed in
response to a specific attack. The most effective evasion defense will be one which is not
reactive, but rather proactive. An optimal adversarial defense should be able to detect and
reject adversarial samples generated with any attack style on any dataset without flagging
legitimate samples.
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6.1.2 Contributions
We designed the broad spectrum defense to defend against a wide spectrum of evasion attacks and subsequently to improve the performance of a network on any dataset
when under attack. The broad spectrum defense can scale to protect any size classifier and
is not biased by adversarial data in the training phase. As adversarial data is not used in the
creation of this defense, we believe that the defense will generalize well to future adversarial attacks providing some level of protection. The broad spectrum defense falls short of
an optimal evasion defense as it does not achieve the ideal but unrealistic goal of detecting 100% of attack samples from every attack without flagging (detecting) any legitimate
data as adversarial. We observed that BSD is able to outperform Feature Squeezing and
MagNet – two state of the art approaches – in all explored cases. Although broad spectrum
defense is not an optimal solution to the problem of detecting evasion samples, it appears
to contribute an additional level of robustness against existing attacks on all datasets.
In this work, we evaluated BSD against non-LP norm attacks, demonstrating the
difficulty of defending against such attacks. The unique nature of using different non-LP
attacks allow for the evaluation of attack samples that fall outside of the normally explored
LP norm attack space. The approach of using these non-LP norm attacks demonstrates the
importance of trying to define and reject the entire adversarial space as opposed to trying to
define the adversarial space explicitly using existing attacks. This work highlights the need
for an adversarial defenses capable of defending any dataset and classifier against any (or,
at least a broad spectrum of) attacks. The adversarial defense crafted to meet these three
criteria may even generalize to future attacks. BSD lays the foundation for creating and
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evaluating such a defense.

6.2

Future Work
Future work should include designing an attack effective against this defense. Car-

lini has demonstrated that modifying the Carlini Wagner attack allows it to defeat MagNet,
the accuracy of BSD can be significantly degraded through this same white box attack[4].
A true white box attack, can be viewed as a worse case scenario, although it is very unrealistic. BSD does not claim to be robust to a white box attack, improving its white box
performance is a possible avenue for future work.

The attack scenario analyzed in this work falls under “gray box” as the attacker has complete access to the classifier, but is unaware of the defense. The “gray box” scenario is
realistic as an attacker can easily obtain a set of pretrained models and formulate attacks
against them. Often the classifier used by the defender is one of these pretrained models,
or the adversarial samples generated for the pretrained model are effective against the defenders model. Future work can also involve benchmarking this defense against future gray
box attacks and attempting to build out the modular nature of this defense to increase its
robustness. When adding additional detectors one must weigh the increase in robustness
against the increase in false positive detections.

We hope that this work will inspire the creation of more proactive defenses that are robust
against LP and non-LP norm attacks. A robust defense should work on data of varying
scale from datasets as small as MNIST up to datasets as large (and potentially larger) than
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ImageNet. A robust defense should be compatible with any neural network of any size from
a simple Convolutional Neural Network up to and beyond a complex EfficientNet model.
Another consideration for this potential defense is to manage the trade-off between the
ability to detect adversarial samples and the detection of false positives. A truly robust and
provably complete adversarial defense sounds like an impossibility, but BSD shows that
this impossible goal can be deconstructed into finite problems we can attempt to solve.
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